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ABSTRACT
Whistleblowers play an important role in filling gaps
in government food safety systems. Unfortunately, several
dominant food-producing states have pursued legislative
initiatives that punish farm whistleblowers and silence
investigative tactics. First, this research describes various
state legislative initiatives that curb criticism ofagriculture.
The work analyzes the federalfood safety system and how
these protections limiting agriculturalcriticism contravene
thatfood safety net. Further, the research analyzes the free
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speech concerns in the newest protectionist laws. The
analysis recommends strategies and future research to
improve agriculture safety and protectfree speech in an
evolvingfood safety landscape.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in
the United States each year forty-eight million people will be sickened from
food borne illness.' Of those, 128,000 will be hospitalized and three
thousand will die.2 Although the government provides food safety standards
and inspectors, there are gaps in the system. 3 Whistleblowers play an
important role in filling those gaps to improve food safety.' In 2008, a
whistleblower report of animal abuse and food safety violations led to the

*Professor of Business Law, Henry W. Bloch School of Management, University of

Missouri-Kansas City. Professor Reid gratefully acknowledges financial support for this
research from the Bloch Summer Research Grant Program.
** Adjunct Instructor of Business Law, Texas A&M University-Central Texas; Business
Law Attorney, U.S. Army. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Army, Department
of Defense, or the United States.
The authors dedicate this article to their late friend and colleague, Megan Mowrey, J.D.,
Ph.D., who contributed research in the early stages of the project and moral support and
enthusiasm thereafter. She is greatly missed.
1. CDC Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, CNTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodbomeestimates.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2014).
2. Id.
3. See Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae

Supporting Plaintiffs at 4, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS
(D. Utah Jan. 15, 2014) (No. 49), availableat
http://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/RCFPAmicusALDF.pdf

(citing

Continuing

Problems in USDA's Enforcement of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,
11Ith Cong. (2010)).
4. Id. at 2-3.
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largest beef recall in history.' Moreover, despite improved technology and
evolving best practices, incidence of foodborne illness is still pervasive.6
Food producers play a major role in self-identifying food
contamination hazards in the U.S. food safety system.' Such a system would
seem to require individuals on farms and in food production facilities be free
to investigate and report potential concerns about animal treatment or crop
handling. Unfortunately, several dominant food-producing states have
pursued legislative initiatives that in effect would punish farm
whistleblowers and silence investigative tactics.
These protectionist
measures are the subject of this research.
Part II of this analysis describes various state legislative initiatives that
curb criticism of agriculture. These laws take different forms and are broadly
characterized as agricultural protectionism herein. Part III explains the
federal food safety system and how protections limiting agricultural criticism
contravene that food safety net. Part IV points out inconsistencies and recent
events that make it unclear whether current federal policy favors agricultural
protectionism or food safty. Part V analyzes the free speech concerns that
agriculture protectionism spawns. This constitutional discussion focuses on
the newest protectionist laws that criminalize lying to get a farm job and
whether they violate a whistleblower's "right to lie." Additionally, it
evaluates First Amendment concerns with new measures mandating
employee prompt disclosure of farm animal safety violations. Finally, the
analysis recommends strategies and future research to improve agriculture
safety and protect free speech in an evolving legal landscape.
II. AGRICULTURE PROTECTIONIST LEGISLATION

Agriculture protectionism has taken various forms in the last quarter
century. Legislative initiatives have changed over time in response to public
criticism, especially about infringed free speech rights, but also in response
to food safety concerns that can get suppressed when unhealthy farm
practices are protected from scrutiny.
This Part highlights various
protectionist legislation to reveal an ever-changing legal landscape.

5. David Brown, USDA Orders Largest Meat Recall in U.S. History, WASH. POST
(Feb. 18,2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/17/AR2008021701530
.html.
6. See Trends in FoodborneIllness in the United States, 2012, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/dsfoodnet2012/reportcard.html
(last updated Apr. 18, 2013).
7. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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A. First GenerationProtections
Statutory rights to farm have been around for decades in all fifty states.'
Historically, these laws have been used to shield farmers from neighbors'
nuisance suits. 9 In some instances, these protections were so expansive that
courts struck them down as unconstitutional takings of plaintiffs'
properties.' 0
Another example of state protectionist legislation emerged during the
1990s. After Washington apple growers failed in a common law product
disparagement case against CBS over a critical segment on 60 Minutes,"
twelve states passed civil food libel laws to address perceived shortcomings in
the common law when public criticism about food safety stems public demand
for the product.' 2 These laws have been widely criticized as unconstitutional
infringements on free speech." Nevertheless, they remain on the books in

8. Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why
Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 103, 103 (1998).
9. Id at 104.
10. See, e.g., Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa June 16, 2004);
see also Emily A. Kolbe, Note, "Won't You Be My Neighbor? "Living with Concentrated
AnimalFeedingOperations,99 IOWA L. REV. 415,429 n.90 (2013) (citing Carrie Hribar,
Understanding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Their Impact on
Communities, NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, 11-12 (2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understandingcafos nalboh.pdf).
11. See Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
12. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-620 to -625 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113 (2011);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-31-101 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 865.065 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. §§
2-16-1 to -4 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-2001 to -2003 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3:4501-4504 (2011); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1-251, -253, -255, -257 (1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-44-01 to -04 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81 (West 2011);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 2, §§ 5-100 to -102 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-1 to -4
(2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 96.001-.004 (West 2005). For analysis
of the different standards of proof in the twelve state food libel laws, see Rita Marie Cain,
Food inglorious Food: Food Safety, FoodLibel and Free Speech, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 275
(2012); see also Marianne Lavelle, FoodAbuse Basisfor Suits, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1997,
at AOl (claiming that 1960s' critics of the pesticide DDT would be liable under standards
of proof in food libel laws).
13. See Cain, supranote 12, at 307-10; Ronald K.L. Collins, Free Speech, FoodLibel,
& the First Amendment . .. in Ohio, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); Howard M.
Wasserman, Two Degrees of Speech Protection: Free Speech Through the Prism of
Agricultural DisparagementLaws, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 323, 323 (2000); Lisa
Dobson Gould, Comment, Mad Cows, Offended Emus, and Old Eggs: Perishable
Product DisparagementLaws and Free Speech, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (1998);
Kevin A. Isem, When Is Speech No Longer Protected by the First Amendment: A
Plainiff's Perspective ofAgricultural DisparagementLaws, 10 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 233,
253-55 (1998).
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all twelve states and the South Dakota statute currently is at issue in a $1.2
billion disparagement case against ABC News and others.14 This analysis
will not address food libel laws further, except to the extent that
recommendations discussed below apply to them, as well as to other state
protectionist efforts.
At the same time the food libel laws were emerging from state
legislatures, the first generation of "ag-gag" laws appeared." These laws
generally concerned trespass and harm to property at animal facilities and
properties with field crops.' 6 Additionally, however, they criminalized
unauthorized photographing or recording at the agriculture facility." In
14. Beef Prods., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 2d 936 (D.S.D.
2013). On March 7, 2012, ABC broadcast a segment on its evening news program about
the product which BPI calls "lean finely textured beef' (LFTB). Thereafter, ABC
broadcasted eleven follow up reports and numerous online communications about the
product and its manufacturer, repeatedly referring to LFTB as "pink slime," a term
originally coined by USDA microbiologist Gerald Zimstein, who appeared in the
original ABC segment and is also a defendant in the case. Daniel P. Finney, Beef
Products Inc. Sues ABC for Defamation Over 'Pink Slime', DESMOINESREGISTER.COM
(Sept. 14, 2012),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120914/NEWS/3091
40042&template=printart. BPI v. ABC News, Inc., Civ. 12-292 (1st Jud. Cir. S.D. Mar.
27, 2014) (memorandum decision), available at
http://beefisbeef.com/assets/content/MemorandumDecision_03272014_(2).pdf.
Most
of BPI's claims have been held over for trial. Only BPI's common law claim for product
disparagement was dismissed, on the ground that it is preempted by the statutory food
libel claim. Id. at 8-9.
15. Journalist Mark Bittman coined the term "ag-gag" in 2011 for legislation that
heightens legal risks for undercover reporters, agriculture workers, or citizen bystanders
who wish to document and report instances of animal abuse or food safety violations.
Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011, 9:29 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-theanimals/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r-0. The label stuck in traditional journalism and
popular media. See, e.g., Animal Cruelty: Attacking the Messenger, Bos. GLOBE (Apr.
15, 2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/editorials/2013/04/14/put-gag-gaglaws/w233JSpwLSOpPolMe2K5aO/story.html. See also Wrong Way to Get Rid of
Cattle Abuse, Illness: Editorial, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013, 12:01 AM),
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130408/wrong-way-to-get-rid-of-cattleabuse-illness-editorial; The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Blowing the Whistle on
Whistleblowers (Comedy Central television broadcast June 11, 2013), avaialable at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-june- 11-2013/blowing-the-whistle-onwhistleblowers.
16. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2013) (effective 1990).
17. See Kevin C. Adam, Note, Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of
State "Ag-Gag" Legislation Under the FirstAmendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1129,
1157-63 (2012); Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of Laws Restricting
Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960,

36

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 11I

1990-1991, Kansas, North Dakota, and Montana passed the first of such
laws." The Kansas version requires that the recording be made with intent
to harm.' 9 North Dakota requires no specific intent.2 0 Conceivably, a person
could be charged for taking a picture of a friend on a North Dakota farm if
he or she failed to get permission first.
The scope of Montana's law is the narrowest.2 1 Like Kansas, Montana
requires intent to damage the enterprise, but further requires an intent to
commit criminal defamation, which occurs when a person communicates
defamatory matter to a third party, which exposes the victim to ridicule,
disgrace, or injury to his or her business, with the knowledge of its
defamatory character and without consent of the subject.2 2 Communication
that is otherwise defamatory is justified, however, if "the defamatory matter
is true [or ifl the communication consists of fair comment made in good faith
with respect to persons participating in matters of public concern."23
Accordingly, this robust intent requirement should only apply to those
reporters who intentionally misrepresent the activities at a facility.2 4 The
criminal defamation intent requirement makes the Montana law the most
narrowly tailored of all the ag-gag laws to date.25 But for the criminality, it
harkens to the civil food libel laws that were passed in the same time frame,
all of which require falsity and disparagement.26

10962-66 (2012); Laura Hagen, 2012 State Legislative Review, 19 ANIMAL L. 497, 51015 (2013); Sonci Kingery, Note, The AgriculturalIron Curtain:Ag Gag Legislation and
the Threat to FreeSpeech, FoodSafety, andAnimal Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645,
656-64 (2012); Jessalee Landfried, Bound & Gagged: Potential First Amendment
Challenges to "Ag-Gag" Laws, 23 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 377, 391-400 (2013);
Jessica Pitts, Note, "Ag-Gag" Legislation and Public Choice Theory: Maintaining a
Diffuse Public by Limiting Information, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95, 97-103 (2012).
18. Like the Kansas law, North Dakota's act prohibits trespass and damage to or theft
of property at animal facilities, see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21.1-01 to -05 (2013)
(effective 1991) (including a Category One - No Recording provision). See id. § 12.121.1-02; compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02.1-.5, .7 with N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-21.1-02.6.
19. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c).
20. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02.
21. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (2013) ("A person who does not have
the effective consent of the owner and who intends to damage the enterprise conducted
at an animal facility may not: . . . enter an animal facility to take pictures by photograph,
video camera, or other means with the intent to commit criminal defamation.").
22. Id. § 45-8-212(1)-(2) (2013).
23. Id. § 45-8-212(3)(a), (c).
24. Id. (justifying otherwise defamatory speech).
25. Id.
26. See Cain, supra note 12.
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No one was ever prosecuted under any of these first generation ag-gag
laws and the agricultural protectionist movement was quiet for a generation
thereafter. Recently, however, additional states have enacted "ag-gag" laws,
and others have considered similar legislation. 27 These evolving efforts to
protect farms from scrutiny have gotten increasingly creative and have made
recognizing and grouping ag-gag legislation a dynamic process.
Nevertheless, understanding this protectionist evolution helps to reveal the
safety and free speech concerns that are discussed below. The remainder of
this Part will explain the evolution of these state ag-gag laws and their
enforcement.
B. Categoriesof State Ag-Gag Laws

-

For purposes of this analysis, a definition of what makes a law an aggag statute, as opposed to some other agricultural protectionism, is useful.
This article defines ag-gag laws as any that would chill good faith undercover
investigating or reporting of abuse or safety violations by an employee or
citizen at agricultural facilities with the force of criminal law. Prior authors
have suggested categorization schemes for ag-gag laws, and this analysis
modifies those classifications, particularly to encompass the newest'
enactments. 28 Thus far, the majority of ag-gag legislation can be said to
criminalize one or more of four categories of behavior: (1) recording,
photographing, videotaping, or audio-recording at agricultural facilities
[hereinafter "Category One - No Recording"]; (2) possession or distribution
of recordings made on agricultural facilitieS 29 [hereinafter "Category Two
No Distributing"]; (3) dishonesty while applying for employment in order to
gain access to a facility [hereinafter "Category Three - No Lying"]; and (4)
failure to report recorded abuse and/or relinquish recordings within an
extremely short timeframe [hereinafter "Category Four - Mandatory
Disclosure"]. Some legislation has additional components, but all the aggag laws and bills discussed herein will fit within one or more of these
categories. As will be seen next, Categories Three and Four, which are the

27. See Adam, supra note 17, at 1163-65.
28. See Adam, supra note 17, at 1131 (offering a three-part classification that maps
onto the categories employed here up to this article's Category Four); Landfried, supra
note 17, at 394, 398 (offering a five-part classification that maps onto the four categories
presented in this article and adding a fifth called agricultural trespass); Bollard, supra
note 17, at 10961 (limiting ag-gag laws to the variety in Categories One and Three of
this article).
29. This type of ag-gag bill was proposed in earlier legislative sessions, though not
prevalent in 2013-2014. See Adam, supra note 17, at 1164. Adam suggests that
Category Two bills have fallen out of favor with ag-gag proponents due to mounting
criticism of the category's overt constitutional weaknesses. See id. at 1173.
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focus of most of this discussion, emerged after criticism about Categories
One and Two.
C. The Evolution ofAg-Gag Enactments

The second wave of ag-gag enactments emphasized new ways to chill
whistleblowing and undercover reporting.30 Public outcry against second
generation ag-gag legislation has been significant,3 ' in part because of free
speech implications, but also because of the glaring begged question: what
do food producers have to hide?
Iowa ushered in the second generation of ag-gag legislation when it
amended its existing "Offenses Relating to Agricultural Production"
statuteS 32 with a new crime entitled "Agriculture Production Facility
Fraud." 33 Similar to first generation statutes, portions of Iowa's law address
trespass and property damage at animal and crop facilities. 34 The addition
of "Agriculture Production Facility Fraud," however, introduced Category
Three - No Lying. Iowa's law criminalizes (1) obtaining access to an
agricultural production facility under false pretenses, 3 and (2) lying on a job

30. While the earlier ag-gag laws were all Category I - No Recording, the 2012-2014
acts included multiple categories.
31. See, e.g., Nicole M. Civita, 2012 Developments in Food Law and Policy, 18
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 39, 91-92 (2013) ("According to an opinion poll by Lake Research
Partners. . . '71 percent of Americans support undercover investigative efforts by animal
welfare organizations to expose animal abuse on industrial farms, including 54 percent
who strongly support the efforts.' Additionally, 64% 'of Americans oppose making
undercover investigations of animal abuse on industrial farms illegal, with half of all
Americans strongly oppose[d]."').
32. IOWA CODE §§ 717A.1-717A.4 (2015).
33. Id. § 717A.3A. See Letter from Terry E. Branstad, Governor, to Matt Schultz,
Iowa Sec'y of State (Mar. 2, 2012), available at
http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/linc/84/extemal/govbills/HF589.pdf (providing a copy of
the amendment signed into law).
34. IOWA CODE §§ 717A.2-717A.3.
35. Contrary to some sources, Iowa did not pass a Category One and Category Two
ag-gag
bill
as
well.
See, e.g., Ag-Gag Laws, SOURCEWATCH,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Ag-gaglaws#lowa
(last modified July 22,
2014). Indeed, Senate File 431 would have criminalized the creation, possession, and
distribution of ag-facility recordings. See S.F. 431, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. Sec.
9, §§ 717A.2A.1.a-b (Iowa 2011), available at http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/CoolICE/default.asp?Category-Billlnfo&Service=Billbook&menu=text&ga=84&hbill=SF4
31. It did not make it into the version of the bill signed by the governor, however. See
Letter from Terry E. Branstad, Governor, to Matt Schultz, Iowa Sec'y of State, supra
note 33; IOWA CODE § 717A (2015), available at
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ico/code/717a.pdf.
36. IOWA CODE §717A.3A.I.a.
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application or agreement "with an intent to commit an act not authorized by
the owner of the agricultural production facility, knowing that the act is not
authorized."37
While seemingly just one more state to adopt protectionist legislation,
Iowa's ag-gag law represents a major addition to the legal landscape because
of the state's significant agricultural productivity. According to the 2012
Agriculture Census, Iowa ranks second only to California in total agricultural
sales, up fifty-one percent since the 2007 census." Iowa ranks first in egg
and soybean production, second for livestock sales and second for total crop
sales.39 Thus, when protectionist criminal laws chill the speech of Iowa
whistleblowers about unsafe farm conditions, the negative impact on food
safety is disproporationately heightened.
Shortly after Iowa's ag-gag bill became law, Utah enacted its new aggag crime, "Agricultural Operation Interference."40 Utah's bill is part of its
criminal code for property destruction. 4 1 It is a Category One - No Recording
and Category Three - No Lying bill.42 Utah criminalizes recording images
or sounds at agriculture production facilities without permission4 3 and
criminalizes obtaining access to a facility under false pretenses." Further,
the law criminalizes applying for employment at an agricultural operation
with the intent to create a recording when the applicant knows such
recordings are prohibited, yet still creates one." Thus, the law covers the
undercover reporter who applies for a job expecting to record wrongdoing

37. Id. § 717A.3A.1.b. A Category Four - Mandatory Disclosure-like provision,
offering immunity for violations of agricultural trespass to those who turn over any
recordings of suspected animal abuse to authorities within seventy-two hours of filming,
did not make the final law. See Landfried, supra note 17, at 399 n.126 (referring to a
proposed immunity provision).
38. Zoe Martin, Iowa Leads Nation in Many Ag ProductionSectors, IOWA FARMER
TODAY (Mar. 13, 2014), http://m.iowafarmertoday.com/news/crop/iowa-leads-nationin-many-ag-production-sectors/article_63e4a5d6-aa01-11 e3-9e9d00la4bcf887a.html?mobile touch=true.
39. Id.
40. The Iowa ag-gag bill was signed by the governor on March 2, 2012. See Letter
from Terry E. Branstad, Governor, to Matt Schultz, Iowa Sec'y of State, supra note 33.
Utah's governor signed his state's bill on March 20, 2012. See H.R. 187, 2012 Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012), availableat http://le.utah.gov/-2012/bills/hbillenr/HBO 1 87.pdf.
41. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-101 to -112 (West 2014).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 76-6-l12(2)(a) (knowingly or intentionally leaving a recording device to
record an image or sound); id § 76-6-112(2)(c)(iii) (recording images or sounds while
employed and present); id § 76-6-ll2(2)(d) (recording an image or sound while
committing criminal trespass).
44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b).
45. Id. § 76-6-112(2)(c).
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and the good faith employee who discovers wrongdoing at work, decides to
document it and blow the whistle.
Later in 2012, Missouri passed its own Category Four - Mandatory
Disclosure bill. 4 6 It makes it illegal for a "farm animal professional" 7 to fail
to turn over to authorities within twenty-four hours any recordings of
perceived animal abuse or neglect. 48 Additionally, Missouri's bill makes any
intentional splicing, editing, or manipulation of the recording prior to
submission a crime.49
Although several ag-gag bills were proposed in 2013, none became
law.o Idaho broke the reprieve in February 2014 when it passed a Category
One - No Recording and Category Three - No Lying law." Among other

things, "Interference with Agricultural Production"5 2 makes it illegal to
"obtain employment with an agricultural production facility by force, threat,
or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the
facility's. . . owners,. . . business interests or customers.""

It also

criminalizes entering an agricultural facility and, without the owner's
express consent, making "audio or video recordings of the conduct of an
agricultural production facility's operations." 5 4 Although the penalty is only
a misdemeanor, it could carry a year of jail time." Under this law a good
faith employee could obtain employment without false pretenses, make a
clandestine recording of wrongdoing on the premises and be subject to
imprisonment.
D. Ag-Gag Litigation

Like the first generation of ag-gag laws, there is no record of
prosecutions related to Iowa's and Missouri's second-generation bills. Utah

46. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (2013) (approved by the governor July 9, 2012)
(effective August 28, 2012).
47. A "farm animal professional" is defined as "any individual employed at a location
where farm animals are harbored." Id. § 578.005(6).
48. Id § 578.013.1.
49. Id § 578.013.2 to .3.
50. See infra Part I.E.
51. See Dan Flynn, Idaho Governor Signs 'Ag-Gag' Bill Into Law, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/02/governor-otter-shouldreconsider-idaho-ag-gag-bill-says-chobani-founder/#.UxOMsRdWzc.
52. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (2014) (amending Chapter 70, Title 18 of the Idaho
Code to include the ag-gag bill); see also S. 1337, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014),
availableat http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2014/S1337.pdf.
53. Id. § 18-7042(1)(c) (including provisions for property damage and trespass).
54. Id. § 18-7042(1)(d).
55. See id. § 18-7042(3).
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prosecuted one person who filmed a slaughterhouse worker pushing a cow
with a bulldozer. 6 The charges were dropped, however, because the
defendant was standing on public property adjacent to the facility when she
made the recording." Utah's law only covers recording while on the
premises of the facility.58 Thereafter, the previously charged defendant and
several others filed a civil rights complaint challenging the Utah law. 9 They
claim the Utah law violates First Amendment free speech rights, and also
violates equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.o The plaintiffs further claim the state law is preempted by the
federal False Claims Act ("FCA") under the Supremacy Clause. 6' The
federal FCA is designed for citizen watchdogs to blow the whistle on fraud,
waste and abuse in government contracts. 62 The government contracts
implicated in agricultural food protectionism involve food provided for
school lunch programs.6 3
Idaho has yet to prosecute anyone under its new statute, but activists
already have sued the state to enjoin enforcement of the Idaho law.' Many
of the same plaintiffs are involved in both the Utah and Idaho civil cases and
articulate most of the same complaints.15 Like the Utah action, the Idaho
civil case claims preemption based on the federal False Claims Act, but also

56. See Complaint at 9-10, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-00679RJS (D. Utah July 22, 2013) [hereinafter ALDF Complaint], available at
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/news/Ag-Gag-Complaint.pdf. For an account of the
events that led to Amy Meyer's prosecution, authored by her co-plaintiff, see Will Potter,
First "Ag-Gag" Prosecution: Utah Woman Filmed a Slaughterhousefrom the Public
Street,
GREEN
is
THE
NEW
RED
(Apr.
29,
2013),
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/first-ag-gag-arrest-utah-amy-meyer/6948/.
57. Jim Dalrymple, Utah prosecutor dismises suddenly high profile 'ag-gag' case,
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (May 1, 2013, 7:39 AM),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56240592-78/case-meyer-law-gag.html.csp.
58. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
59. See Civil Docket Report, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-00679RJS (D. Utah 2013). The additional plaintiffs include journalists, academics, People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF),
among others. Id.
60. ALDF Complaint, supra note 56, at 34-39.
61. Id.at37-39.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 37-38. See also Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at
25-27, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS (D. Utah Dec. 10,
2013) (No. 33), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/190760493/Utah-Ag-GagChallenge-Plaintiffs-Opposition-to-the-Motion-to-Dismiss.
64. See Complaint, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW (D.
Idaho Mar. 17, 2014), available at
https://acluidaho.org/wpsite/wp-content/uploads/1.complaintI .pdf.
6 5. Id
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under the Food Safety Modernization Act ("FSMA") and the Clean Water
Act ("CWA").66 The district courts in Utah and Idaho are in separate federal
circuits, meaning the Ninth and Tenth federal appeals circuits may be
deciding the constitutionality of these similar ag-gag laws simultaneously.6 7
There is one indication that ag-gag laws could influence criminal
prosecutions in states without such laws on their books. Colorado, a state
without an ag-gag law, prosecuted an undercover reporter for animal cruelty
in November 2013, when she turned over video footage of animal abuse that
she filmed while working for Quanah Cattle Company from mid-July
through September. 68 The reporter, Taylor Radig, was affiliated with the
organization, Compassion Over Killing.6 9 In her two months of employment,
she filmed such substantial evidence of abuse that three employees were
fired and charged with multiple counts of cruelty after Compassion over
Killing published the footage.70 The Weld County Sheriff s Office explained
that Radig "may have been criminally negligent for failing to turn over the
videotapes to law enforcement in a timely manner, under Colorado Revised
Statutes 18-9-201 and 18-9-202."' Those statutes, however, reveal no
express or implied timely reporting requirements. 72 Ultimately, the county
dropped the charges against Radig," but the prosecution clearly evoked the
Category Four - Mandatory Disclosure approach, despite having no such law
in Colorado.74
66. Id. at TT 168-86. For a discussion of preemption under the Food Safety
Modernization Act, see infra Part 111.
67. About U.S. Federal Courts, FED. BAR ASsOC., http://www.fedbar.org/PublicMessaging/About-US-Federal-Courts 1.aspx (last vistited Mar. 5, 2014).
68. See Wayne Harrison, Woman Who Took Cattle Abuse Video Charge with Animal
Abuse,
7NEWS
DENVER
(Nov.
23,
2013,
12:01
AM),
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/woman-who-took-cattle-abusevideo-charged-with-animal-abuse.

69. Id.
70. See Matt Ferner, Undercover Video Alleges Shocking Animal Abuse ofNewborn
Calves at Colorado Facility, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2013, 2:03 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/14/video-newborn-calfabuse n 4275001.html (containing the video filmed by Radig and published by
Compassion Over Killing); see also Alexis Croswell, ChargesDroppedAgainst Animal
Rights Investigator Accused of Animal Cruelty, ONE GREEN PLANET (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://www.onegreenplanet.org/news/charges-dropped-against-animal-rightsinvestigator-accused-of-animal-cruelty/.
71. Croswell, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
72. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-9-201 to -202 (2014).
73. ChargesDroppedAgainst Woman Accused ofAnimal Cruelty, CBS DENVER (Jan.
11, 2014), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/01/11/charges-dropped-against-womanaccused-of-animal-cruelty/.
74. There has been news, too, of a representative in Colorado intending to sponsor a
Category Four - Mandatory Disclosure bill in Colorado that would make it a
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E. ContinuingProtectionistLegislative Agenda
In 2013-2014, numerous states proposed ag-gag bills-some with
multiple proposals-that did not pass.75 Most of the protectionist proposals
in the states continue to involve one of the four ag-gag categories described
above, especially Categories Three and Four, but a few discussed next are
new and especially creative.
The Arkansas Senate put forward two ag-gag bills in 2013.76 One
would have criminalized conducting an animal investigation by anyone who
was not a certified law enforcement officer.77 This proposal did not fit into
any ag-gag category listed above. Still, it would have criminalized citizenreporting of incidents concerning farm animals.7 8 The bill eventually passed
but without the ag-gag portion included.7 9
The Indiana legislature contemplated three ag-gag bills in 2013, all of
which were Category One - No Recording bills because they sought to

misdemeanor to fail to report animal abuse within twenty-four hours. See Mary Roberts,
Soapbox: Let's Stop Making Telling the Truth a Crime, COLORADOAN.COM (Jan. 30,
2014), http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20140130/OPINION04/301300080/.
75. See Anti-Whistleblower Bills Hide Factory-FarmingAbuses from the Public,
HUMANE Soc'Y OF THE U.S. (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/campaigns/factoryfarming/factsheets/aggag.html#id=album- 1 85&num=content-.
76. See S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013), available at
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Acts/Act1160.pdf (Senate Bill 13
passed without the ag-gag provisions and was enacted as Act 1160); Arkansas Senate
Bill 13, LEGISCAN (Apr. 12, 2013), https://legiscan.com/AR/bill/SB13/2013; S.14, 89th
Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Ark.
2013),
available
at
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/SBl4.pdf; SB14 - Creating the
Offense of Interference with a Livestock or Poultry Operation,ARK. STATE LEG.,
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/201 3R/Pages/BillStatusHistory.aspx?mea
sureno=SB14 (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
77. See S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013), available at
http://legiscan.com/AR/text/SBl3/id/684193/Arkansas-2013-SB 1 3-Draft.pdf
(providing a proposed draft of Senate Bill 13). See id. at Sec. 3, § 5-62-128 (discussing
the parameters of, and penalties for, conducting "improper animal investigations").
78. Id. at Sec. 3, § 5-62-128.
79. See S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013), available at
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Acts/Actll 60.pdf.
The
other
Arkansas proposal targeted Category One - No Recordings and Category Three - No
Lying offenses. See S. 14, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013), available at
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Bills/SB14.pdf. This proposal died
in May, 2013. See SB14 - Creatingthe Offense ofInterferencewith a Livestock or Poultry
Operation, ARK. STATE LEG.,

http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/BillStatusHistory.aspx?mea
sureno=SB14 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) (providing the legislative history of Senate
Bill 14).
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criminalize photographing or recording images at an agriculture facility.so
One, however, would have further required the Indiana Board of Animal
Health to register people convicted of crimes concerning an agricultural
operation, much akin to a sex offender list.si Arguably, such a registry would
further chill would-be undercover reporters or concerned employees from
making recordings because the repercussions for being "listed" are unclear.
None of the Indiana bills passed.82
Undeterred by those failures, Indiana's senate proposed an ag-gag law
for the 2014 session that is both unique and nearly unbounded. It would
have amended the state's property crimes to allow agricultural operations to
post a notice of "prohibited acts that may compromise the agricultural
operation's trade secrets or operations." 8 4 The proposal would have also
criminalized any violations of those private, farm-by-farm notices." While
this bill makes no mention of prohibited recordings, distribution of
recordings, employment fraud, or mandatory disclosure requirements, it
could fit all four ag-gag categories." Indeed, it had the potential to be the
most sweeping ag-gag bill yet because it would have vested agricultural
operations with the power to create felonies themselves, which would raise
serious due process concerns. 87 The only limit on what acts could be
prohibited by notice (and thus enforced with a felony charge) is that
prohibited acts had to be linked to "compromis[ing] the agricultural

80. S. 373, 118th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013), available at

http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2013/IN/IN0373.1.html;
S. 391, 118th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2013/IN/IN0391.1.html; H.R. 1562, 118th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2013/IN/IN 1562.1 .html.
81. See Ind. S. 391; see also Ind. H.R. 1562 (proposing an amendment to IND. CODE
§ 15-17-3-13 to add subsection (33), which requires the registry).
82. See 2013 Indiana GeneralAssembly Wrap-Up, HOOSIER ENVTL. COUNCIL, Section
IV.e, http://www.hecweb.org/billwatch2013/2013-legislative-session-in-review/
(last
visited Sept. 12, 2014) (discussing the bills and their failure to pass).
83. See IndianaSenate Bill 101, OPENSTATES,
http://openstates.org/in/bills/2014/SB101/#billtext (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (providing
information about Senate Bill 101).
84. S. 101, Sec. 2, § 35-43-1-9, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014, as
introduced), availableat http://iga.in.gov/legislative/2014/bills/senate/101/#.
85. Id. Specifically, Senate Bill 101 decreed that any person "who knowingly or
intentionally commits an act at an agricultural operation that is a prohibited act listed on
a notice . .. commits a Level 6 felony." Id
86. See generally id.
87. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The potential due process problems with such an
approach are beyond the scope of this analysis, but they are easy to anticipate when the
particulars of a felony are on notice only in a private facility.
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operation's trade secrets or operations." 8 Conceivably, an agricultural
operation could have prohibited anyone entering the premises from
communicating to anyone (ever) any information learned or instances
observed at the facility. Such a prohibition could serve to protect the
operation's trade secrets from being compromised. But it could also
constitute the most suffocating ag-gag bill yet on the books. The protectionist
language did not make it into subsequent versions of the bill." The attempt,
however, reflects the creativity of those promoting the agricultural
legislative agenda and the lengths some lawmakers will go to protect
agriculture interests.
Nebraska Legislative Bill 204 included Category Three - No Lying and
Category Four - Mandatory Disclosure provisions.9 0 The Nebraska Category
Four proposal was both a carrot and a stick: failing to report suspected
livestock abuse or neglect within twenty-four hours would be a class III
misdemeanor; 9 1 but reporting within twenty-four hours would make the
reporter "immune from liability except for false statements of fact made with
malicious intent."92 Potentially, if an undercover investigator had lied on a
job application about an affiliation with an animal rights organization in
order to gain employment so he could perform undercover reporting on the
operation, that could be construed as such "malicious intent" that would strip
away the Category Four immunity. If so, the Category Four - Mandatory
Reporting requirement would impose self-incrimination of the Category

88. See Ind. S. 101, Sec. 2, § 35-43-1-9.
89. See S. 101, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014, engrossed version),
availableat
http://iga.in.gov/static-documents/c/8/19/c819fO82/SB0 101.04.COMH.pdf.
90. See LB204 - Change and Provide Criminal Sanctions Regarding Animals and
Animal Facilities, NEB. LEG.,
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view bill.php?DocumentlD= 17956 (last visited
Sept. 12, 2014) (providing the legislative history of Legislative Bill 204).
91. Legis. B. 204, 103rd Leg., 1st Sess., Sec. 2, §§ (3), (8) (Neb. 2013).
92. Id. at Sec. 4, § (4).
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Three -No Lying crime.93 Legislative Bill 204 did not pass in 201394 and
was carried over into the 2014 term95 when it finally failed.9
North Carolina's 2014 enactment may actually represent a new
Category Five ag-gag law. North Carolina Senate Bill 648 created the
criminal offense of "employment fraud." 97 Despite mimicking the ag-gag
Category Three and Category Four scheme, this bill is not specific to
agricultural facilities." It criminalizes the act of gaining employment by
giving false or incomplete application information when the purpose of
gaining access to the place of employment is to create a photo, video, or
audio recording within the facility. 99 It goes on to require that any recording
made be turned over to local law enforcement within twenty-four hours. 00
There is no immunity for the reporting employee.' 0 ' Accordingly, the
relinquishment. mandated by the law could trigger self-incrimination if
employees turning over recordings effectively reveal their crimes of
"employment fraud" committed in accessing the workplace. The bill died in
2013,102 but was resurrected and passed in 2014.103
93. If the immunity under Category Four is unavailable to the employee who
intentionally lied on the job application, then the Category Four mandatory reporting
would bring to light the very Category Three violation that strips the immunity.
Accordingly, any combined Category Three and Category Four laws (without immunity
for both under Category Four) could violate the constitutional right to remain silent. See
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
94. See LB204 - Change and Provide Criminal Sanctions Regarding Animals and
Animal Facilities,supra note 90.
95. See State CarryoverProcedures, STATESIDE Assocs.,
http://www.stateside.com/wp-content/uploads/State-Carryover-Procedures-FactPadInsert.pdf (last updated July 12, 2013) (noting that in Nebraska, bills introduced in the
regular session of odd-numbered years are held over for consideration during the regular
session in even-numbered years).
96. See LB204 - Change and Provide Criminal Sanctions Regarding Animals and
Animal Facilities,supra note 90.
97. S. 648, Gen. Assemb., 2013 Sess. (N.C. 2013), availableat
http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2013/bills/senate/PDF/s648vl.pdf. The bill would amend
Article 19 of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes by inserting the ag-gag
bill, entitled "Employment Fraud," at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-105.1 (2013). Id.
98. See generallyid
99. Id. at Sec. 1, § 14-105.1(a)(1).

100. Id. at Sec. 1, § 14-105.1(c).
101. See generallyN.C. S. 648, Sec 1.
102. See Ag-Gag Laws, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Aggaglaws#citenote-34 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) ("The bill was re-referred to the

Senate committee on the Judiciary on May 7, 2013, and died without a vote when the
legislative session ended July 26, 2013.").
103. Senate
Bill
648/S.L.
2014-110,
N.C.
GEN.
ASSEMB.,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BiIIID=S64
8 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
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This general employment bill has strong agricultural protectionist
implications because North Carolina has a large number of concentrated
animal feeding operations ("CAFOs"), especially for chicken and swine. 104
Thus, North Carolina's new law may reflect the next generation of efforts by
legisltures in states with a strong agricultural economy to protect their ag
industry while masking that effort in general across-the-board legislation.
F. Other Related Statutes and Torts
States that have not adopted food libel or ag-gag laws discussed above,
still provide other forms of agriculture protection.os For example, more than
half the states have laws that heighten penalties for fraud, property damage
and/or trespass when it involves an animal or agricultural facility to help
deter crimes against agribusiness. 10 6 Additionally, at least eight states have
enacted animal terrorism statutes.o
Like the ag-gag statutes discussed
above, these laws tend to target the activities of animal rights activists. Their
aim, however, is to protect property rather than to stifle reports of unsafe or
inhumane food production practices."os Thus, the laws do not impact the free
speech of whistleblowers and suppress discussion of food safety concerns
directly the way ag-gag laws do.
Finally, states already have torts and crimes that have been used to
challenge the kinds of behavior ag-gag laws target. Ag-gag proponents

104. DANIEL IMHOFF, Introduction to CAFO: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL
FACTORIES xvi (Daniel Imhoff ed., 2010).
105. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-21-10 to -260 (2012), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/query.php?search=DOC&searchtext-47%209%2071 0&c
ategory-CODEOFLAWS&conid=7309575&resultpos=O&keyval=979&numrows= 10
(containing no ag-gag provision). States with the ag-gag law categories discussed above
tend to include them along side or within statutes that heighten penalties for injuries done
to agricultural facilities. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2013) (containing an
ag-gag provision).
106. Bollard, supra note 17, at 10961.
107. See Landfried, supra note 17, at 379 n. 11, 393 n.87.
108. Id. at 393. The federal Animal Enterprise Interference Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2012),
and its predecessor, the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA), 18 U.S.C. § 43
(1992), also protect farms and other animal operations from interference by animal rights
activists and others. The original federal version was limited to property damage that
caused a "physical disruption" of animal enterprise activity, 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1992),
akin to the state animal terrorism laws that target vandalism and other property damage.
The new federal version covers behavior that damages or interferes with the animal
enterprise, rather than physically disrupts it. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2012). The act also
includes conduct involving threats, not just property damage. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(B)
(2012). Since this present analysis is focused on state protectionist activities, it will not
analyze this federal protection in further detail.
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"have stressed that the underlying goal of the laws is to prevent animal-rights
activists from infiltrating facilities to capture footage that they will then
present in a manner that is untruthful and harmful to the farming industry."o9
Agricultural facilities already have recourse against that kind of behavior in
actions for defamation, breach of loyalty, willful misrepresentation, tortious
interference, intrusion, and unfair trade practices. Indeed, reporters have
been found liable under those legal theories in the performance of their
reporting.'o Accordingly, ag-gag laws criminalize behavior that is already
illegal or actionable.' and move the bulk of enforcement from torts to crimes
or hybrid crime-torts, shifting at least some of the cost of enforcement from
alleged victims to all taxpayers." 2 This shift confirms that lawmakers in
these states are willing to provide protection for agriculture that other
economic sectors do not enjoy.
Ag-gag laws are especially incongruous when understood in relation to
the current food safety approach embodied in federal law. This food system
and its reliance on self-reporting by food workers is discussed next.

109. Adam, supra note 17, at 1173; see also Sara Lacy, Comment, Hardto Watch: How
Ag-Gag Laws Demonstrate the Need for Federal Meat and Poultry Industry
Whistleblower Protections,65 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 144 (2013).
110. See Landfried, supra note 17, at 384 nn.33-36; see also Adam, supra note 17, at
1175; Kingery, supra note 17, at 664-67; John K. Edwards, Should There Be Journalist's
PrivilegeAgainst NewsgatheringLiability?, 18 COMM. LAW. 8, 10 (2000).
111. But see Bollard, supra note 17, at 10970 ("Only two tort suits appear to have arisen
from animal rights undercover investigations. In both cases, the courts applied reasoning
similar to the Desnick and Food Lion courts' reasoning and dismissed all of the charges
brought. The courts' dismissal of these claims suggests why Iowa and Utah lawmakers
saw a need for the Ag-Gag laws."). This history Bollard describes is similar to the course
of events that spawned statutory food libel protection in the 1990s. See supra notes 1114 and accompanying text.
112. As acknowledged by other commentators, "criminal law . .. has the unique ability
to assign blame and censure with a moral force that the civil law cannot. It effectively
sends the message that it is prohibiting behavior which lacks any social utility... . Crime
is also seen as a moral fault and carries with it the weight of shame and stigma that the
commission of a tort simply does not." Bryan H. Druzin & Jessica Li, The
Criminalization of Lying: Under What Circumstances, If Any, Should Lies Be Made
Criminal?, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 571-72 (2011). Given the public utility
of previous undercover reports on the food industry, it is hard to see how whistleblowing
merits criminal sanction.
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SAFETY SYSTEM

The United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") regulates the
production of meat, poultry, and eggs." 3 The debate about protectionism
embodied in state ag-gag laws has focused on food products governed by the
USDA because surreptitious videos that spawned those laws usually
involved beef, pork or poultry production facilities." 4 Nevertheless, mass
production and distribution of fresh fruits and vegetables are a major source
of food safety concerns,"' and most of the recently passed ag-gag laws apply
to both animal and crop farms."' Fruits, nuts, dairy, seafood, and vegetables
are within the scope of Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").'" In 2011,
the Food Safety Modernization Act ("FSMA")"I amended the FDA's
authority to regulate food safety." 9 The FSMA, however, specifically states
20
that nothing in it shall limit the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture
under the Federal Meat Inspection Act,121 the Poultry Products Inspection
Act,' 22 or the Egg Products Inspection Act.1 23
The competing USDA and FDA food safety systems, including
whistleblower protection (or lack thereof) in each scheme, are discussed
next.

113. The Food Safety and Inspection Service ("FSIS") is the primary body within the
USDA that carries out food safety authority under multiple enabling statutes. See
generally

About

FSIS,

USDA-FOOD

SAFETY

&

INSPECTION

SERVICE,

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/informational/aboutfsis
(last modified Oct. 1,
2014).
114. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5.
115. See generally Rita Marie Cain, Salads, Safety andSpeech Under a NationalLeafy
Greens Marketing Agreement, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 311 (2012).
116. See generally supra Part 11.
117. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) established the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in 1938. Pub. L. No.75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
118. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885, 3947 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The FDA is an agency within the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). Accordingly, all the mandates in
FSMA are directed at the HHS Secretary. FDA Organization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ (last updated Feb. 25, 2015).
119. 21 U.S.C. § 350j (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
120. 21 U.S.C. §2251(4) (Supp. IV 2011).
121. Id. at (A).
122. Id. at (B).
123. Id. at (C).
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A. USDA Safety Approach
Of the numerous USDA divisions that share some responsibility for
food safety,124 FSIS has been characterized as the most important.'2 5 FSIS
executes the USDA's statutory mandate to examine animals used in
commerce, both before and after slaughter.126 To carry out its authority, FSIS
inspectors are expected to have complete, unfettered access to both food
processing plants and their products.1 2 7 Inspectors can order any animal or
carcass to be removed if unfit for human consumption.1 28 Failure to comply
can result in an inspector revoking the facility's inspection privileges,
effectively shutting the operation down.1 29
Historically, inspection was done using sight, touch, and smell to detect
livestock disease or food contamination.1 30
Inspectors may detect
contamination visually, and require facilities to rectify fecal matter (a carrier
for the microbes and pathogens in food) on animals and carcasses.'"' But
external inspections are inadequate to address microbial infestations, such as
E-coli.1 32 Accordingly, the USDA implemented a significant overhaul in its

124. For example, its Veterinary Services provide surveillance of animal, poultry, and
aquaculture health. Animal Health, USDA-ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION
SERv., http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth
(last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (follow "Monitoring and Surveillance" hyperlink, on left;

then "National Animal Health Surveillance System (NAHSS)," on right).
125. Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety
Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 61, 99 (2000).
126. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603 (2014); Poultry Products
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 452, 455 (2014).
127. 9 C.F.R. § 300.6(b) (2004). Eileen Starbranch Pape, Comment, A Flawed
Inspection System: Improvements to Current USDA Inspection Practices Needed to
Ensure Safer BeefProducts, 48 HOUs. L. REV. 421, 432 (2011).
128. 9 C.F.R. § 311.1 (1970).
129. 9 C.F.R. §§ 302.1-302.3 (1971) (requiring inspection at every non-exempt
establishment, and of all livestock and products entering a non-exempt establishment
and all products prepared at a non-exempt establishment (emphasis added)). The
pervasive nature of this inspection mandate leads to the conclusion that a USDA decision
to withdraw inspectors has the effect of suspending operations. See Katherine A. Straw,
Note, GroundBeefInspections andE. Coli 0157:H7: Placingthe Needs ofthe American
Beef Industry Above Concernsfor the Public Safety, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 355, 359
(2011); see also Pape, supra note 127, at 443-44.
130. See Pape, supra note 127, at 434.
131. See generally Cain, supra note 115. Slaughterhouses are allowed to use organic
acid sprays to wash away fecal matter. FSIS randomly tests ground beef for E-coli, as
do producers, voluntarily. See Pape, supra note 127, at 433-34.
132. See Straw, supra note 129 (discussing the intricasies of E-coli infestation).
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inspection regiment to a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point
("HACCP")'" system.
HACCP is a "systematic approach to the identification, evaluation, and
control of food safety hazards."'34 HACCP has been characterized as
"management-based regulation"' in which producers self-identify potential
risks throughout food processing and establish minimal values at which the
risks can be controlled or eliminated at critical control points.' 3 6 Instead of
FSIS inspectors looking for contamination and removing the defective
product, "HACCP takes a preventative approach by requiring the placement
of controls on conditions that pose threats to contamination throughout the
process."'
The FSIS inspector now only evaluates the plan and inspects
the documentation generated at the critical points, not the food.' 3 8 Food
safety tasks at critical control points have shifted from FSIS inspectors to the
facilities' own employees.' 3 9
In such a system, transparency and accountability within the food
producing operation are critical to safety.1 40 If reporting on the procedures in
the plan is based on anything less than full disclosure, the resulting FSIS
approval will be based on flawed assumptions. When protectionist laws
hamper whistleblowers or investigative reporters, the HACCP process is
undermined. As such, state protectionist statutes that stifle whistleblowing
and investigative reporting are antithetical to the current USDA safety
scheme.
Shortcomings in USDA's current HACCP system' 4 ' have led to
proposed changes. One such revision, the Safe Meat and Poultry Act of

133. See generally Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 21
C.F.R. §§ 120.1-.25 (2001).
134. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON MICROBIOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR FOODS, HACCP
Principles and Application Guidelines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 14, 1997),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/HACCP/ucm2006801.htm.
135. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691, 696-98
(2003).
136. Lauren Gwin & Arion Thiboumery, Local Meat Processing:Business Strategies
and Policy Angles, 37 VT. L. REV. 987, 1001 (2013); Eva Merian Spahn, Keep Away
from Mouth: How the American System ofFood Regulation Is Killing Us, 65 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 669, 710-11 (2011).
137. Pape, supra note 127, at 438.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 439.
140. Id. See also Straw, supra note 129, at 364-66.
141. Joby Warrick, An Outbreak Waiting to Happen: Beef-Inspection FailuresLet In a
Deadly
Microbe,
WASH.
POST,
Apr.
9,
2001,
at
Al,
http://www.cyberclass.net/outbreak.htm. See also James S. Cooper, Note and Comment,
SlaughterhouseRules: How Ag-Gag Laws Erode the Constitution,32 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH.

52

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 11I

2013, not only specifies new requirements for safe meat handling, but also
includes protection for whistleblowers.1 4 2 The bill would protect employees
who are "discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any
other manner discriminated against" for providing information to a
supervisor or government agency about an act that the person reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of food safety laws, rules or regulations, or
that constitutes a threat to the public health.' 43 The bill is still pending.1'
B. FDA Food Safety Under the FSMA
Under its original enabling legislation, the FDA exercised its food safety
authority by supporting industry self-regulation and investigating safety
problems after the fact.1 45 For example, in 2006, an E. coli outbreak resulted
in 205 confirmed illnesses and three deaths across twenty-six states.1 4 6
Afterward, the FDA and others 4 7 traced the outbreak to Dole brand spinach
and contamination from one field in California.1 48
At that time, the FDA's quality-control guidelines for fresh produce
addressed concerns that could potentially expose produce to pathogens:
water sources, manure, field sanitation, worker hygiene, facilities sanitation,
and transportation.1 4 9
The International Fresh Produce Association

&

& ENVTL. L. 233, 238-40 (2014); Larissa Wilson, Comment, Ag-Gag Laws: A Shift in
the Wrong Directionfor Animal Welfare on Farms, 44 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 311,
326-28 (2014).
142. S. 1502, 113th Cong. § 270 (2013), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113sl502is/pdf/BILLS-11 3sl 502is.pdf.
143. Id
144. Travis Korte, Safe Meat and Poultry Act of 2013,CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.datainnovation.org/2014/02/safe-meat-and-poultry-act-of2013/.
145. See generally Significant Dates in U.S. Food & Drug Law History, U.S FOOD
DRUG

ADMIN.,

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucml 2835.htm
(last
updated Dec. 19, 2014) (providing a historical timeline of FDA enabling legislation).
146. FDA Finalizes Report on 2006 Spinach Outbreak, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Mar. 23, 2007),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucml 08873.ht
m; How FDA Works to Keep Produce Safe, DRUGS.COM (Mar. 1, 2007),
http://www.drugs.com/fda-consumer/how-fda-works-to-keep-produce-safe-66.html.
147. How FDA Works to Keep Produce Safe, supra note 146.
148. The investigation was one of the first to trace a food poisoning outbreak to its
source. Denis W. Steams, On (Cr)edibility: Why Food in the United States May Never
be Safe, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 274 (2010).
149. FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVE STAFF, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION,
GUIDE TO MINIMIZE MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS FOR FRESH FRUITS AND
VEGETABLES 39 (1998), availableat
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developed these safety guidelines in 1998."'o Thus, the FDA guided industry
regarding safety practices, using industries' own self-regulatory standards.
The government agency lacked all authority to mandate its own preventative
safety measures prior to 2011.
In the face of increasing food contamination incidents,'5 2 however, the
2011 FSMA created several new duties and powers in the FDA.'1 3 For the
first time, the FDA is required to mandate comprehensive safety standards
for production and handling of raw fruits and vegetables.1 54 Further, under
FSMA, the FDA will partner with the USDA and officials in states and
localities, to coordinate food safety programs.'"' Thus, the statute expressly
recognizes the importance of a state and local safety net to protect national
food safety interests. State protectionist legislation that stifles open dialogue
about safety concerns seems antithetical to this FSMA safety scheme.
Additionally, under FSMA, food importers have the primary role in
verifying the safety of the imported food from foreign suppliers. 116 Such a
system gives private parties an important role in self-governance of the food
safety system."' Again, state protectionism that strips private parties of their,
ability to monitor these food importers seems counter-intuitive to safety.
The importance of employee reporting of safety violations is reflected in
the FSMA's express whistleblower protection scheme. If an employee reports
a potential statutory violation, testifies about it, or refuses to participate in it
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryinformation/Gui
danceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/UCM 169112.pdf.
150. Matthew Kohnke, Note, Reeling in a Rogue Industry: Lethal E. Coli in
California'sLeafy Green Produce & the Regulatory Response,12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
493, 502-03 (2007).

151. There is no such enabling legislation to be found prior to 2011.
152. In June, 2011, Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc. of Monterey, California, voluntarily
recalled over two thousand cases of "Italian Blend" salad bags in twelve U.S. states and
Canada after random sampling by the Ohio Department of Agriculture found the bacteria
listeria. Dole Recalls Thousands ofBags of Salad Greens, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (June 24,
2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/06/dole-recalls-thousands-of-bags-of-salad/.
Listeria was the pathogen found on cantaloupes from one large Colorado facility in the fall
of 2011 that caused thirty-three deaths and 147 confirmed cases of listeriosis across twentyeight states. Multistate OutbreakofListeriosisLinked to Whole Cantaloupesfrom Jensen
Farms, Colorado, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 28, 2011),

http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/cantaloupes-jensen-farms/index.html.
153. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ (last updated Mar. 5, 2015).
154. 21 U.S.C.

§ 350h(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2011).

155. Id. at § 399c(b)-(d) (Supp. IV 2011).
156. Id. at § 384a(a)(1) (2013).
157. See generally Tacy Katherine Hass, New Governance: Can User-Promulgated
CertificationSchemes Provide Safer, Higher Quality Food?, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77,

86 (2013).
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on the job,'5 8 the FSMA prohibits any covered employer from firing or
otherwise discriminating against that whistleblower "with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."l 59 This
FSMA whistleblower protection, however, does not expressly preempt a
food producer under FDA jurisdiction from pursuing legal recourse outside
of employment rights or benefits, such as a civil food libel claim, or a
criminal charge under state ag-gag laws.160 The dynamic between federal
food safety policy and agricultural protectionism is discussed next.
IV. PROTECTIONISM OR PREEMPTION? UNCERTAIN FEDERAL POLICY

State protectionist legislation that suppresses negative information
coming out of farms would seem to directly contravene the federal food
safety schemes discussed above that are built around management-based
regulation and self-reporting by food producers. Nevertheless, one
commentator analyzed the whistleblower protection in FSMA to conclude
that it does not expressly or impliedly preempt retaliatory civil food libel
claims against food safety whistleblowers.1 6 ' Since that time, OSHA has
enacted regulations to implement FSMA whistleblower protections 6 2 that
are considered broad in their scope.'63 Still, the conclusion that the FSMA
does not preempt these state efforts at agricultural protectionism seems even
stronger when applied to newer state ag-gag laws. Category One through
Four ag-gag protections all establish criminal violations. FSMA prohibits
retaliatory discharge or other adverse employment actions by foodproducing employers against their employees.1 6 4 These whistleblower
protections clearly do not reach state prosecutors who pursue criminal
charges against whistleblowers. The same conclusion would apply to any
ag-gag prosecution in the face of the proposed USDA whistleblower
provisions in the 2013 Safe Meat and Poultry Act.' 65
At best, then, federal preemption can only be a defense in an ag-gag
prosecution, namely that federal food safety law impliedly preempts any

158. 21 U.S.C. § 399d(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. IV 2011).

159. Id at § 399d(a).
160. Id.
161. See Cain, supra note 12, at 306-07.
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1987 (2014).
163. Earl "Chip" Jones III, Linda Jackson & Jill Weimer, OSHA Issues New Rule for
Food
Safety
Whistleblowers,
LITTLER
(Feb.
21,
2014),
http://www.Iittler.com/publication-press/publication/osha-issues-new-rule-food-safetywhistleblowers.
164. Cain, supra note 12, at 306-307.
165. See Safe Meat and Poultry Act, supra note 142.
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state protectionism that shields food safety violators from scrutiny.1 66 As
was noted above, secrecy is contraindicated under HACCP, which is now
the safety approach of both USDA and FDA.1 67 Nevertheless, a successful
defense of implied preemption based on a general need for openness in the
food safety systems seems unlikely in a state ag-gag prosecution.16 This
defense would have working against it, the presumption against federal
preemption.1 69
70
Recently, in Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris,'
the Supreme Court
concluded the USDA's slaughterhouse and packing plant regulations under
the Federal Meat Inspection Act ("FMIA") preempted California's stricter
standards for handling disabled livestock."'
The scope of the FMIA
preemption, although broad according to the Court, clearly focuses on state
laws that impose requirements on meat production operations at Food Safety
and Inspection Service ("FSIS") inspected facilities. 7 2 State protectionist
laws discussed herein impose no such requirements. Accordingly, nothing in
the preemption language applied in Harris would seem to apply to state
protectionist laws that stifle whistleblowers.
Further highlighting the apparent weakness of current federal law to
preempt state agricultural protectionism, federal lawmakers recently
attempted to add express federal protectionism in the federal farm bill. 113

166. Alternatively, the United States could challenge the state criminal laws like it
successfully did against Arizona's immigration reform laws. See United States v.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). In the Arizona case, however, the government was
protecting federal immigration authority, which expressly preempts state immigration
laws. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012). Such
express statutory basis for challenging ag-gag laws neither applies under FSMA nor is
proposed under USDA revisions.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 133-40.
168. Plaintiffs in the Idaho ag-gag civil litigation asserted preemption under FSMA.
See Complaint, supra note 64, ¶¶ 177-180.
169. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) (cited by the
Court in United States v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509-10, supporting the Court's
declination to preempt one provision of the Arizona law on checking the status of
arrestees until the law had been in effect, enforced, and interpreted by the state courts).
Recently, a Tennessee court rejected a preemption defense in a state improper-labeling
crime based on federal copyright law. See State v. Pierson, No. W2012-02565-CCAR3-CD, 2014 WL 261414 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2014). This criminal preemption
defense was unsuccessful even in the face of express preemption in federal copyright
law. See 17 U.S.C § 301(a) (2013) (unavailable for ag-gag defendants under FSMA).
170. Nat'1 Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 966 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2014)).
173. Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2013, S. 954, 113th Cong. (2013)
(emphasis added).
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The farm bill is omnibus legislation1 74 passed once every five to seven years
that sets the country's agricultural and food security agenda.175 The latest
version became law February 7, 2014.176 One provision that did not make it
into the final law nevertheless is instructive on current federal and state
tensions regarding agriculture policy, for instance the Protection of Interstate
Commerce Act ("PICA"), not a standalone act but a section of H.R. 2642,177
would have arguably preempted all state agriculture laws that require tougher
safety or animal treatment standards than ones set by federal law.178
Arguably, PICA represented an unprecedented attempt to extend the
Commerce Power into areas traditionally controlled by states. 179 The
National Conference of State Legislatures opposed the measure, calling it a
violation of the Tenth Amendment that would hinder states' abilities to
"protect their citizens from invasive pests and livestock diseases, maintain
quality standards for all agricultural products and ensure food safety." 80
Passed by
The impetus for PICA was California's Proposition 2.i
voters in 2008, this law requires that cages for veal calves, pregnant sows,
and egg-laying hens be large enough for the animals to lie down, stand up,
fully extend their limbs and turn around freely.182 In the wake of this
successful voter initiative, California legislators passed a 2009 law banning
the in-state sale of any eggs not produced under conditions required by the

174. The bill tends to span hundreds of pages because so many issues are addressed.
For example, the Senate's proposed 2013 farm bill, Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs
Act of 2013, S. 954, 113th Cong. (2013), spans 1163 pages. See GovTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 13/s954 (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
175.

See generally DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE NEXT

FOOD AND FARM BILL 24 (Watershed Media, 2d ed. 2012).
176. David Jackson, Obama Signs Farm Bill, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2014, 4:23 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/02/07/obama-farm-bill-signinglansing-michigan/5282827/. In signing the bill, the President compared it to a Swiss
Army knife because it does so many things. Id.
177. The Agricultural Act of 2014, H.R. 2642, 113th Cong. (2013).
178. Id.; see also Lydia O'Conner, Legal Experts Slam Controversial Farm Bill
Amendment In Letter To Congress, HUFFINGTON POsT (Jan. 25, 2014, 4:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/06/law-professors-farm-bill_n_4401489.html.
179. See O'Connor, supra note 178. See also Pamela Vesilind, PreemptingHumanity:
Why NationalMeat Ass'n v. HarrisAnswered the Wrong Question, 65 ME. L. REV. 685,
692-702 (2013).
180. Melanie Condon, NCSL Stakes Out Farm Bill Position in Letter to House, Senate
Conference Leaders, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2013/11/22/ncsl-stakes-out-farm-bill-position-in-letter-tohouse-senate-conference-leaders.aspx.
181. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § § 25990-94 (effective Jan. 1, 2015).
182. Id.
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California cage law.' 83 In other words, the California market is now closed
to all egg sellers who do not comply with California's cage mandate. This
helps California egg producers to compete on price with out-of-state egg
suppliers who are not constrained by mandates like Proposition 2. PICA's
sponsor, Steve King, represents Iowa, the largest egg producing state in the
U.S.1

84

Although PICA did not make it into the 2014 farm bill,' vestiges of it
continue to percolate around the California egg law. The attorney general of
Missouri initiated an action against the California law, alleging that it
violates the rights of egg producers outside California to sell their eggs in
interstate commerce.' Subsequently, officials representing Iowa, Nebraska,
Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Alabama joined the suit.' 87 Thus, proponents of
agricultural protectionism now are moving from the statehouse to the
courthouse to attack food safety and animal rights initiatives. 8
For federal food safety policy to trump state agricultural protectionism,
express federal preemption will be needed.' 89 For now, however, a defense
against state ag-gag laws under the First Amendment free speech right could
be a stronger challenge to state agriculture protectionism, as is discussed
next.

183. Treatment of Animals - Shelled Eggs - Sale for Human Consumption Act, ch. 51,
A.B. No. 1437, 2010 Cal. Stat. 430.
184. See Martin, supra note 38. See also Chartsand Maps: Annual Egg Production by
States,
NAT'L
AGRIC.
STATISTICS
SERV.
(Apr.
29,
2014),
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Chartsand Maps/Poultry/eggmap.asp.
185. NCSL, The AgriculturalAct of 2014,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/scmi/2014 fullfarmbillanalysis.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2014) (explaining that the King Amendment was not included in the
2014 farm bill).
186. Mike McGraw, Missouri Enlists in the Egg Wars, KANSAS CITY STAR (Feb. 1,
2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/2014/02/01/4792128/missouri-enlists-inthe-egg-wars.html.
187. Jacob Bunge & Jesse Newman, States Join Suit to Block CalforniaEgg Law,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/03/06/states-joinsuit-to-block-california-egg-law/?mg=blogswsj&url=http%253A%252F%252Fblogs.wsj.com%252Flaw%252F2014%252FO3%25
2FO6%252Fstates-join-suit-to-block-california-egg-law.
188. The California voter initiative has survived several legal challenges. See Kathleen
Masterson, Court Upholds Calfornia's Law on Chicken Cage Sizes, CAPITAL PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 13, 2012), http://archive2.capradio.org/articies/2012/09/13/court-upholdscalifornia's-law-on-chicken-cage-sizes.
189. See Cain, supra note 12, at 317-18. A federal bill, the Egg Products Inspection
Act Amendments of 2013, would gradually phase in national cage requirements similar
to California's for egg-laying chickens. H.R. 1731, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013),
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hrl731.
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V. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM

'

.

The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' State governments are
9
bound by the First Amendment under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Agriculture protectionist measures have received some First Amendment
analysis. The free speech issues inherent in early food libel laws have been
discussed at length and are not repeated here.' 92 Similarly, several student
authors have analyzed ag-gag laws through the lens of the First
Amendment.' 93 In those analyses, the authors apply several traditional free
95
94
speech approaches such as Content-Based Restrictions,1 Prior Restraints'
and Expressive Conduct.' 96 They differ in the degree of scrutiny they believe
applies to the laws and they differ in some of their conclusions.' 97 This is not
surprising. As distinguished constitutional scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky,
noted, there are many First Amendment doctrines, yet "no prescribed order
for analysis."' 98

One consistency is reflected in the literature: Categories One and Two
(No Recording and No Distributing) have received the bulk of the attention,
while Category Three - No Lying and Category Four - Mandatory
Disclosure have received scant analysis.' 99 This Part explains free speech
issues not previously scrutinized relative to Category Three - No Lying laws

190. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
191. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
192. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
193. See Landfried, supra note 17; Bollard, supra note 17; Adam, supra note 17;
Kingery, supra note 17. See also Cooper, supra note 141.
194. See Landfried, supra note 17, at 388-89; Adam, supra note 17, at 1169-70;
Kingery, supra note 17, at 670-71.
195. See Landfried, supra note 17, at 389; Adam, supra note 17, at 1171-72; Kingery,
supra note 17, at 669-70.
196. See Bollard, supra note 17, at 10974-75; Adam, supra note 17, at 1133-37;
Kingery, supra note 17, at 667-69. Landfried also discusses Incidental Restraints and
Overbreadth, supra note 17, at 380-81, while Bollard opines on underinclusion, supra
note 17, at 10975-77.
197. See generally Landfried, supra note 17; Adam, supra note 17; Kingery, supra note
17; Bollard, supra note 17.
198.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 960

(Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 4th ed. 2011). "Simply put, it is not possible to
comprehensively flowchart the First Amendment as a defined series of questions in a
required sequential order." Id.
199. Bollard, supra note 17, at 10977; Landfried, supra note 17, at 389. See also,
Larissa U. Leibmann, Fraudand First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How
United States v. Alvarez Impacts ConstitutionalChallenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 566, 589 (2014).
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A. The Constitutional "Right to Lie"
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court stated "there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact." 200 Other statements by the Court before and after
Gertz suggested that the First Amendment free speech right did not protect
lying. 201 Nevertheless, in 2012, the Court held that the First Amendment
protects some intentional lies.202 This Part explains the Alvarez opinions to
conclude that the Idaho, Iowa and Utah Category Three - No Lying laws
may well violate this recently-articulated free speech protection.
While publicly introducing himself as a newly elected member of the
water district board for Pomona, California, Xavier Alvarez falsely claimed
to have received the Medal of Honor.2 0 3 He was convicted under the federal
Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized falsely stating one had received a
military decoration or medal. 2 0 The motive for Alvarez's lie did not appear
to be any political or material benefit. 205 As discussed herein, the fact that
Alvarez did not lie to secure employment does not sufficiently distinguish
his protected lie from those of undercover activists who lie to get farm jobs.
In a 6-3 result, a plurality struck down the Act.2 0 6 Justice Kennedy
wrote an opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor.207 Justice Breyer concurred in the result, along
with Justice Kagan.208 Justice Alito was joined by Justices Scalia and

200. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
201. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) ("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never
been protected for its own sake.").
202. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
203. Dahlia Lithwick, Heavy Medals: Sotomayor's Boyfriends Lie to Her? And the
Other Untruths that Worry the Supreme Court, SLATE.COM (Feb. 22, 2012, 8:13 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/supremecourt dispatches/2012/02/x
The
avier alvarez lied about winning the congressional_medal of honor_.html.
Stolen Valor Act enhanced penalties for those who falsely claimed receipt of the
Congressional Medal of Honor. 18 U.S.C. § 704(c) (2014).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2014).
205. Alvarez,132 S. Ct. at 2542.
206. Id. at 2537.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 2551-56.
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Thomas in dissent.2 09 All three opinions are instructive that Category Three
- No Lying laws will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.2 10
Justice Kennedy's opinion rejects an analysis of past precedents that
"all proscriptions of false statements are exempt from exacting First
Amendment scrutiny." 21 ' He then goes on to distinguish the Stolen Valor
Act from three examples of false speech crimes that have been upheld: lying
to a government official, perjury, and falsely representing oneself as a
government official.2 12 The government has a compelling interest that
requires punishing each of these lies, even in the face of rigorous free speech
defense.2 13 By contrast, the lies targeted by the Stolen Valor Act are ones
"simply intended to puff up oneself." 2 14
Having established that free speech precedents do not require
truthfulness as the basis for First Amendment protection, the opinion zeroes
in on speech prohibited by the Stolen Valor Act. Justice Kennedy decries
the notion of an unlimited governmental power "to compile a list of subjects
about which false statements are punishable."2 15
Equating such an
environment to George Orwell's 1984, he warned that if the Stolen Valor
Act were sustained, "there could be an endless list of subjects the National
Government or the States could single out." 2 16
Arguably, the Category Three - No Lying laws are exactly such an
unconstitutional list. Or not. Justice Kennedy quickly articulates one
"limiting principle" that could allow states to criminalize lying to get a farm
job: "Where false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other
valuable considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that
the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First

209. Id. at 2556-65.
210. The holding in a plurality decision is the "position taken by those Members who
concurred in thejudgment on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977). For a discussion of "the Marks rule," see Justin Marceau, Plurality
Decisions: Upward-FlowingPrecedentand Acoustic Separation,45 CONN. L. REV. 933
(2013). Under the Marks rule, Alvarez stands for the proposition that the Stolen Valor
Act was an unconstitutional violation of free speech. The concept that the First
Amendment protects some lies is supported by all three opinions in the case, as is
discussed in this Part.
211. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546. "Absent from those few categories where the law
allows content-based regulation of speech [obsenity or fraud, for example] is any general
exception to the First Amendment for false statements." Id. at 2544.
212. Id. at 2545-46.
213. Id. at 2546.
214. Id
215. Alveraz, 132 S.Ct. at 2547.
2 16. Id.
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Amendment."217 In other words, the "right to lie" that Alvarez clarifies
seemingly does not protect lying to get a job, which ag-gag Category Three
laws target. Justice Kennedy seems to equate lying on a job application with
fraud because the lie secures a valuable exchange.218
The opinion goes on to uphold the government's compelling interest in
banning Alvarez's lie, namely to protect "the integrity of the military honors
system in general, and the Congressional Medal of Honor in particular." 2 19
Notwithstanding this interest of reinforcing the military mission, criminal
prosecution of liars like Alvarez under the Act did not establish the necessary
"link between the Government's interest in protecting the integrity of the
military honors system." 2 20 In particular, the dynamics of free counter
speech ("refutation") could offset the lie. 221 Further, "[s]ociety has the right
and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse. These ends
are not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate public
discussion through content-based mandates."222
Even if refutation were insufficient to offset the lie of charlatans like
Alvarez, criminal prosecution under the Stolen Valor Act does not satisfy the
"exacting scrutiny" 223 free speech protection requires. Justice Kennedy
opined that a government database of Medal of Honor winners was a
mechanism that could protect the integrity of the military awards system

217. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976), for the proposition that fraudulent speech
is unprotected).
218. But see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir.
1999) in which false statements in obtaining jobs for undercover reporters were
indisputable. Yet no fraud damages could be attributable to the falsities because the
undercover employees performed the jobs as hired and the plaintiff received its expected
exchange for the compensation paid.
Id. at 514. Further, plaintiffs alleged
administrative damages for hiring these surreptitious employees, then having to replace
them, were inconsistent with the at-will nature of the employment. They could quit or
be fired anytime. Id. at 513.
219. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548. In an unsuccessful prosecution that pre-dated Alvarez,
a district court concluded that the objective of the Stolen Valor Act did not amount to a
compelling government interest. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 119091 (D. Colo. 2010). This was also the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in striking
down the prosecution in Alvarez. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th
Cir. 2010).
220. Alvarez,132 S. Ct. at 2549.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2550.
223. Id. at 2551. See also Aaron H. Caplan, Lies and Levels of Scrutiny, AM. CONST.
SOC'Y (June 28, 2012), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/lies-and-levels-of-scrutiny
("[Kennedy's] phrase 'exacting scrutiny' may ultimately become a recognized term of
art that signals a form of super-strict scrutiny extremely intolerant (but still a little
tolerant) of content-based speech restrictions.").
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without any constraint on speech. 2 24 Accordingly, the statute was deemed
unconstitutional.225
To determine if the right to lie would undermine No Lying ag-gag laws,
especially in the face of Justice Kennedy's statement that equates lying in
exchange for a job with fraud, Alvarez requires additional analysis. Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion supports the conclusion that falsity is not
categorically denied free speech protection.226 In particular, "in technical,
philosophical, and scientific contexts," 227 deliberate falsehoods can be the
22 8
basis for further examination and public debate that help reveal truth.
Under this analysis, farm workers who blow the whistle on farm abuses,
revealing themselves to be surreptitious PETA activists or food safety
reporters, present just the kind of a case when a "'clearer perception and
22 9
In
livelier impression of truth, [is] produced by its collision with error."'
with
concerns
speech
the
free
fact, Justice Breyer's discussion here reveals
Category One and Two laws against recording and distributing recordings
also. The farm worker who is simultaneously a PETA activist only reveals
his Category Three - No Lying violation upon release of recordings in
violation of Categories One and Two. Accordingly, the clearer perception
of truth Justice Breyer seeks to protect actually emerges with a trifecta of aggag violations.
The classic whistleblower free speech case, FoodLion Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc.,230 revealed just this combination, of violations
encompassed by ag-gag Categories One, Two and Three. Two ABC
reporters for the show PrimeTime Live were hired at Food Lion supermarkets
using fake identities, addresses, references, and personal histories, including
the omission of their concurrent employment with ABC.23 1 They intended
to film food handling practices in the stores using concealed cameras and
microphones. 232 Today, their behavior in getting and performing these
supermarket jobs clearly would fall within Category One - No Recording
and Category Three - No Lying laws, if the work had been at an agricultural
facility. Eventually, PrimeTime Live broadcast their undercover footage of

224. Id.
225. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537.
226. Id. at 2553.
227. Id.
228. Id. (internal citations omitted). No such case was presented in Alvarez, however:
"[t]he dangers of suppressing valuable ideas are lower where, as here, the regulations
concern false statements about easily verifiable facts." Id at 2552.
229. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15
(Blackwell ed. 1947)).
230. See Food Lion, supranote 218.
231. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999).
232. Id.
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Food Lion employees repackaging fish beyond its expiration date, grinding
beef after its expiration date with fresh beef, and coating chicken with
barbeque sauce to mask its smell. 233 This action in an agricultural
employment setting would amount to violations of Category Two - No
Distributing. Just as Justice Breyer opined in Alvarez,2 3 4 the employees' lies
in Food Lion were necessary to reveal a clearer picture of the truth. In an
agricultural setting, however, ag-gag laws could undermine that revelation.
Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer describes justifiable crimes
against lying, such as perjury and false claims of terrorism.235 Torts or other
civil claims such as fraud, defamation, and trademark infringement can also
withstand free speech scrutiny.2 36 These examples, however, usually require
"proof of specific harm to identifiable victims." 237 In concurring that the
Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional, Breyer found no such limitations on
its reach.238 The Act forbids a lie "in contexts where harm is unlikely or the
need for the prohibition is small."23 9
Focusing on this part of Justice Breyer's opinion, farm interests in
Idaho, Iowa and Utah could argue that Category Three - No Lying laws are
distinguishable from the Stolen Valor Act because they prevent direct harm
from a whistle-blowing employee. This ag-gag defense has an obvious,
perverse twist. Farms need protection from animal or food safety activists
only to hide animal cruelty or unsafe food practices. Category Three - No

&

233. Id. at 511.
234. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552-54.
235. Id. at 2554.
236. Id.
237. Id For a discussion of harm-based free speech jurisprudence, see Clay Calvert
Rebekah Rich, Low-Value Expression, Offensive Speech, and the Qualified First
Amendment Right to Lie: From Crush Videos to FabricationsAbout Military Medals, 42
U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2010); see also Bollard, supra note 17, at 10975.
238. 132 S. Ct. at 2555.
239. Id. Justices Breyer and Kagan depart from the fourjustices who form the Alvarez
plurality in opining that the substantial government interest in protecting military honors
could be satisfied with a more finely tailored statute that included a requirement of actual
knowledge of material harm. Id. at 2555-56. Taking that cue, Congress passed the Stolen
Valor Act of 2013 which criminalizes lying about military honors "with the intent to
18 U.S.C. § 704(b). One
obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit."
commentator analyzes whether lies now criminalized under this new Stolen Valor law
could withstand constitutional scrutiny under the commercial speech doctrine because
the illegal statements would be self-promotion akin to advertising. See Alison L. Stohr,
Comment, Valorfor Sale: Applying the CommercialSpeech Exception to Self-Promoting
Individuals, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 455, 476 (2013). Despite concluding that all speech
targeted by the new Stolen Valor law meets the underlying rationale of the commercial
speech exception, id. at 479, Stohr rejects her espoused constitutional approach and calls
for a reexamination of the commercial speech exception altogether. Id. at 482-83.
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Lying laws are only defensible to protect business operations and
profitability when they quell disclosure of potential public harms. This use
of Breyer's opinion that lies can be prosecuted to avoid obvious harm,240
seems indefensible considering his opinion also supports the principle that
some lying needs constitutional protection to help reveal truth.
Again, Food Lion's analysis about harm from lying undercover
employees is instructive.2 4 1 The FoodLion court upheld claims of trespass

and breach of the duty of loyalty against the reporter/employees because they
"had the requisite intent to act against the interests of their second employer,
Food Lion, for the benefit of their main employer, ABC."242 Similarly,
trespass occurred by filming in non-public areas, directly adverse to Food
Lion's interests.243 Nevertheless, the loyalty and trespass violations in Food
Lion could not be the basis for any damages plaintiff sought in the case from
the economic fallout after the broadcast.2 4 4 The lower court excluded
damages from lost sales and harm to good will because they were not
proximately caused by the loyalty and trespass torts.245 Instead, these
reputation-related damages directly resulted from lost consumer confidence
about Food Lion's food handling practices that were exposed.246 On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit upheld that result but elevated the damage exclusion to a
free speech issue by concluding that Food Lion could not recover these
damages to reputation without proving the constitutional libel standard,
namely knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.2 47 A public

240. For a discussion of torts that would protect against some of the legitimate harms
that might arise from lies about military honors, see Lauren A. Valkenaar, Comment,
Civil Liability Approaches to the Stolen Valor Epidemic, 44 ST. MARY'S L.J. 835, 85277 (2013). As was noted above, legitimate harms are still actionable from behavior
targeted in all ag-gag laws through civil tort claims. See supra Part II.E.
241. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
242. Id. at 516.
243. Id. at 518. By contrast, the court rejected the argument that misrepresentation on
job applications turned the act of showing up to work into trespass because such
misrepresentations did not nullify the employer's consent to enter the property to work.
Id.
244. Id. at 524. The alleged financial effect of ABC's Food Lion expose'-over $1.3
billion in lost stock value. Felicity Barringer, Appeals Court Rejects Damages Against
ABC
in
Food
Lion
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
21,
1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/ 2 1/us/appeals-court-rejects-damages-against-abc-infood-lion-case.html.
245. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 963 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
246. See generally Barringer,supranote 244.
247. FoodLion Inc., 194 F.3d at 522 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964)).
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figure plaintiff cannot circumvent the elevated defamation standard by suing
for other non-reputational torts. 2 48
In reaching this free speech conclusion, the FoodLion court contrasted
the damage claims from those in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 249 In Cowles,
the Supreme Court said a news outlet could not avoid damages under
generally applicable laws, even if payment hindered news gathering and
reporting. 25 0 Cowles found that the promissory estoppel damages for lost
income were unrelated to reputation and, thus, not subject to any special
constitutional scrutiny. 25 1' The damages to reputation in FoodLion were the
direct result of the publication.25 2 Accordingly, the constitutional libel
standard applied (which the supermarket could not possibly meet since the
broadcast was true).253
In summary, FoodLion reveals that whistleblowing employees may be
liable to their former employers for contract damages, but not if the
employment was at will. Further, whistleblowing likely violates an
employee's duty of loyalty, but that duty cannot support a claim for damages
to reputation unless the employer can meet the First Amendment malice
standard. Arguably, Justice Breyer's free speech exception for lies that cause
harm must be understood within the purview of Food Lion. Harm. to
reputation from the lies of an activist applicant/whistleblowing employee
who exposes food safety violations should not be actionable by agriculture
employers.2 54
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion in Alvarez also focuses on harms that
need statutory protection by pointing out the "proliferation of false claims

248. Id. at 522 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)). An elevated
proof requirement also has been applied to private plaintiffs (such as a farm) when the
subject of the alleged defamation is a matter of public concern. See Phila. Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (holding that the burden of proving falsity
lies with the private plaintiff when the defendant is a media defendant speaking on a
matter of grave public concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (extending the Hepps burden of proof to a private plaintiff suing a

non-media defendant).
249. Food Lion Inc., 194 F.3d at 523 (comparing the damages claims with those in
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)).
250. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669; see also Bollard, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
251. Id. at 670-71.

252. FoodLion Inc., 194 F.3d at 523.
253. Id. at 523-24. One commentator argues that ag-gag laws are distinguishable from
the promissory estoppel claim in Cowles because they are not generally applicable laws,
but rather "were drafted to stop expressive activity at agricultural operations . . . ."
Bollard, supra note 17, at 10971. For this reason, ag-gag laws should fall under strict
scrutiny. Id. at 10972.
254. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d
1269, 1276 (Nev. 1995) (reaching a similar conclusion under Nevada constitutional law).
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concerning the receipt of military awards."255 Intangible debasing of military
awards is the most common harm from "stolen valor."256 For the dissent, it
sufficed that Congress reasonably concluded that a comprehensive database
of real award winners could not be compiled and that counter speech would
not adequately refute false claims.2 57
Like the other opinions, the dissent notes that torts and crimes targeting
falsity that have withstood First Amendment challenges. 25 8 Nevertheless,
the dissent concedes that prosecuting some lies still could chill other
protected speech. 259 Here the dissent is instructive regarding Category Three
- No Lying laws:

[t]here are broad areas in which any attempt
by the state to penalize purportedly false
speech would present a grave and
unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful
speech.... The point is not that there is no
such thing as truth or falsity . . . , but rather
that it is perilous to permit the state to be
the arbiter of truth.260
These statements suggest that even the dissenters might shield the lies
targeted in Category Three since the lies are motivated by a concern for food
safety, and the state should not stand in the way of that information.2 6 1
Minimally, all of the opinions in Alvarez suggest that prosecutions
under a Category Three - No Lying law will require a case-by case analysis
of the implications to truth regarding food safety and animal abuse. Beyond
restricting open discourse, these ag-gag laws potentially harbor unsafe,

255. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2558 (2012).
256. Id. at 2559.
257. Id. at 2560.

258. Id. at 2561-62.
259. Id. at 2563-64.
260. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2564. The dissent concludes that lies proscribed under the
Stolen Valor Act present no such risks. Id.
261. A district court that upheld the Stolen Valor Act prior to Alvarez also suggested
constitutional concerns that would apply to Category Three - No Lying laws.
Prosecution of lying "may create conflict between the motivations of the government
and the imperatives of free speech." United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 820
(W.D. Va. 2011).
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abusive farms from public scrutiny by criminalizing the very acts that could
bring the safety abuses to light, namely lying to gain access to the farm. 262
Further, many of the rationales that supported striking down the Stolen
Valor Act support a conclusion that Category Three - No Lying laws are
unconstitutional on their face. Like the Stolen Valor Act, all ag-gag statutes
employ content-based mandates by protecting specific farms and farm
practices. 263 Additionally, the Category Three - No Lying laws go beyond
content-based restrictions to criminalizing the motives of the speaker who is
a farm job applicant. None of the Idaho, Iowa, or Utah laws are limited to
particular factual misstatements, such as using a false name, address, or
employment history in a job application.264 On the contrary, all target the
person's objective in seeking the job.265 The statutes outlaw lying to get a
job "with the intent" to perform acts on the job contrary to the employer's
interests in maintaining farm secrecy.266 As such, Category Three - No
Lying laws target the farm job applicant's viewpoint that possible food safety
or animal welfare wrongs are occurring and should be exposed.
Arguably, if the employee performs the job as promised for the
compensation exchanged, there is not the kind of exchange fraud that Alvarez
suggested was unprotected speech. 267 The intent to come to work and to
work for pay is not fraudulent if that is what the undercover worker does in
fact do. 26 8 Ag-gag employment fraud occurs when the worker uncovers and
discloses unfavorable information on the job. Without some safety or animal
abuse to uncover, the employee hired with a secret motive to uncover such
abuse would just go about his or her job, as hired and paid to do. So-called
agriculture employment fraud only applies when the employee's fraudulent

262. See Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SuP. CT. REV. 161, 164-65; see
also Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the FirstAmendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107 (2006).
263. Only North Carolina's proposed law would extend its provisions about lying to
get a job to any employment, not just agriculture jobs. See supra notes 97-104 and
accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 32-45, 51-55 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 32-45, 51-55 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 32-45, 51-55 and accompanying text.
267. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
268. In Food Lion, the court held that none of the damages alleged by Food Lion could
be attributable to employee falsities. Food Lion Inc., v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 194
F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 1999). The undercover employees performed the jobs as hired,
so Food Lion received its expected exchange for the compensation it paid them. Id. at
514. Further, Food Lion's alleged administrative damages for hiring two employees, then
having to replace them, were inconsistent with the at-will nature of the employment. Id.
at 513. Both could quit or be fired anytime, so misstatements at hiring were not the cause
of any administrative harm. Id.
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access to the workplace actually exposes food safety violations and/or
animal abuse on the job. 26 9
Ag-gag criminal prosecutions seem to present exactly the grave and
unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech that even the Alvarez
dissenters acknowledged is protected under the First Amendment. 2 70 The
significant negative public reaction to all ag-gag legislation 271 reflects a
similar concern, that only farms with something to hide need protection from
job-seeking activists.
In an analysis based on Alvarez of the constitutionality of false
campaign and election speech laws, one commentator raises concerns about
political motivation and selective prosecution:
Although the Court's decision in Alvarez is
badly fractured, there seems unanimous
skepticism of laws targeting false speech
about issues of public concern and through
which the state potentially could use its
sanctioning power for political ends.
Especially dangerous are criminal laws
punishing false speech that could lead to
selective criminal prosecution.272
These concerns about political motivation and selective prosecution
seem equally applicable to enforcement of agriculture protectionist laws in
states whose economies are dominated by agricultural interests. As this
commentator notes, all of the Alvarez opinions suggest these laws violate
important free speech objectives.27 3
269. Some tort cases distinguish between an "intention contained in a promise," such
as the promise to work for compensation, which is not actionable in deceit, and a
"collateral intent, for which the action will lie." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
530 (1977) (Reporter's Note). See also Woods v. Scott, 178 A. 886 (Vt. 1935)
(upholding directed verdict for defendant when he hired and later fired a housekeeper
with the original hope of making her his mistress) (contrary to the Restatement's
characterization, the underlying intent to make plaintiff his mistress was not found
actionable in this case); Comstock v. Shannon, 73 A.2d 111 (Vt. 1950) (finding that a
broken promise did not amount to fraud, but the false statement of an intent not to
compete in the future did). Category Three - No Lying laws seem to zero in on this
sliver of tort cases when they criminalize the collateral intent to investigate, unrelated to
the non-fraudulent promise to work.
270. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2556-65 (2012).
271. See Civita, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
272. Richard L. Hasen, A ConstitutionalRight to Lie in Campaignsand Elections?, 74
MONT. L. REV. 53, 69 (2013).
273. See id.
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B. Free Speech Issues in Mandatory DisclosureLaws
This discussion has referred to Category Four laws as "Mandatory
Disclosure" for ease of reference. In fact, this Category actually comes in
two varieties. Mandatory relinquishment laws require the maker of a
recording to surrender it to authorities within a short period (usually twentyfour to seventy-two hours).274 Alternatively, mandatory reporting laws
simply require certain classes of people to report suspected animal abuse to
authorities, again within a short time. 2 75
Missouri is the only state to enact a Category Four ag-gag law thus
276
Missouri's law makes it illegal for "farm animal professionals" to fail
far.
to relinquish to authorities within twenty-four hours any recordings they
277
This law only
make that they believe depict animal abuse or neglect.
278
It does not apply to
applies to farmworkers recording animal abuse.
recordings of other behavior that might pose food safety violations. 2 79
Such a short reporting period makes it impossible to demonstrate a
pattern of animal abuse or neglect. With a twenty-four hour reporting period,
agricultural facilities always will be able to assert that the recorded behavior
was a one-time event, not normal business practice. Moreover, since
farmworkers under USDA jurisdiction currently have no federal
whistleblower protections, 28 0 there is a good chance that an employee who
complies with the law and submits evidence to authorities of the employer's
animal abuse will be fired and have no ability to document further incidents
that could prove a pattern of abuse.
There are several ways Category Four laws might be analyzed under
the First Amendment. 2 81' Based on the analysis a court might apply to these
274. From 2013-2014, Category Four bills that included a relinquishment requirement
were proposed in New Hampshire and Tennessee, among others. See H.R. 110, 2013
Sess. (N.H. 2013), availableat
https://legiscan.com/NH/text/HB 110/id/679691/NewHampshire-2013-HBl 10Introduced.html; S. 1248, Gen. Assemb., 2013 Sess. (Tenn. 2013), available at
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/108/Bill/SBl248.pdf; H.R. 1191, Gen. Assemb., 2013
Sess. (Tenn. 2013), available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/108/Bill/HBl191.pdf.
275. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text regarding Nebraska's illustrative
proposal.
276. Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (2014).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 14144 and accompanying text.
281. As was noted above, Mandatory Disclosure laws can impose an unconstitutional
obligation to self-incriminate if the disclosure reveals that the reporter also violated a
Category Three Law by lying to obtain employment that resulted in witnessing the
animal abuse. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanyting text. There are additional areas
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Category Four laws, this Part concludes with application of strict and
intermediate scrutiny.
1. Compelled Speech
"The right not to speak is as much a constitutional freedom as is the
right to speak."282 Only the speaker, not the government, possesses "the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message." 2 83 Compelled speech
cases often involve utterances that convey opinion or belief. 28 4 Free speech
autonomy, however, applies "equally to statements of fact the speaker would
rather avoid." 285 For example, in Riley v. Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind of NC.,
Inc., the Court threw out a law requiring professional charitable fundraisers
to disclose to donors what percentage of funds raised actually went to the
charity. 286 The solicitations for contributions were treated as part of the nonprofit's overall charitable or social message, which was the charity's
prerogative to craft without the government's mandate about the expense of
solicitation.2 87 The Court recognized that earlier precedent had been guided
by "the principle that '[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind,"' but it rejected the argument that disclosures
of fact, rather than opinion, fell outside the boundaries of First Amendment
protection.2 88

of constitutional scrutiny for Category Four laws that are outside the scope of this
analysis.

One is whether the mandatory relinquishment laws could constitute a

condemnation that requires just compensation and procedural due process. Another is
that crimes of omission are generally disfavored and might afford some constitutional

protection as such or in combination with a First Amendment theory. See,e.g., Michael
M. O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and
Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 177-78 (2004).
282. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 198, at 1009.
283. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995).
284. See id. (holding that a private parade organizer could not be compelled to include
an LGBT-pride marching unit); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
(striking down a New Hampshire law requiring all noncommercial vehicles to display a
license plate bearing the state's motto "Live Free or Die"); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking a law requiring school children to salute the flag).
285. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
286. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
287. Id. at 798.
288. Id. at 797-98.
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Some scholars have interpreted Riley broadly.289 In dicta, however, the
Riley Court opined that certain factual disclosures might not violate free
speech, such as fundraisers' professional status.2 90 Proponents could
characterize Category Four - Mandatory Disclosure requirements as just
such factual exchanges, rather than compulsion that restricts the "individual
freedom of mind."
Alternatively, many "freedom of mind" decisions are made when
creating a recording, even if no post-film editing is done. The creator decides
what to film, how long to film, whether to include a wide angle for context
or zoom in for effect, and how best to capture the light, all of which speak to
the creator's opinion of the event being recorded. Although some of these
choices may be limited by the logistics of secretly recording suspected abuse,
the capacity for those decisions is present. Additionally, when to release a
film (or an eyewitness account under mandatory reporting) is part of the
whistleblower's message about the extent of perceived animal or safety
abuses at the farm. Riley suggests the worker, not the state, gets to choose
how to craft and disseminate that message, including when to refrain from
disseminating it until the report completely reflects scenes the worker
witnessed, which might take more than twenty-four hours.2 9 1
The prohibition on compelled speech protects listeners as well as
speakers.2 92 Accordingly, any law that dictates early recounting of animal
abuse that a farm worker witnessed might distort listeners' rights to learn the
complete picture of animal treatment at the farm that otherwise would
emerge if the whistleblower were not compelled to report earlier than he or
she would choose freely.

289. See, e.g., Samuel G. Brooks, Comment, Confession and Mandatory ChildAbuse
Reporting: A New Take on the Constitutionality of Abrogating the Priest-Penitent
Privilege, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 133 (2009) ("[A]s long as the individual would not
otherwise make the statement, even compulsion to disclose facts interferes with this
freedom of mind and, therefore, falls within the protections of the First Amendment.").
290. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795, 799 n. 11. Justice Scalia was so opposed to the dicta in
footnote 11 that he wrote his own concurring opinion disavowing it. Id. at 803-04.
29 1. See generally id.
292. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (holding "[i]t is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount . .
[and i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial."); see also Laurent Sacharoff,
Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 384-85 (2008)
(discussing how listener interests rather than speaker interests are paramount in
compelled speech cases).
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2. Content-Based Restriction on Speech
Short fuse mandatory disclosure requirements also may constitute
content-based restrictions on speech because they restrict based on subject
matter and viewpoint. 29 3 As noted, the laws generally restrict reports or
creation of videos that evidence a pattern of livestock abuse or neglect over
a period of time. In Missouri, recordings that track treatment of other
vulnerable populations can be made over time. 294 A recording of elder abuse
need not be turned over to authorities at all, and a report of the abuse need
only be made within a "reasonable time." 295 Suspected pet abuse requires
neither video relinquishment nor reporting.296 in comparison, the Category
Four - Mandatory Disclosure laws restrict the subject matter of the report to
animal abuse recorded by a farmworker during one work shift.
Further, Category Four laws are viewpoint-based. "Animal abuse" or
"neglect" is in the eye of the beholder.2 97 As the discussion of California's
"downer cow" law in Harris reflected,298 California voters and USDA
regulators differed in their views of what should and should not be allowed
in the treatment of livestock. 29 9 The same is true of California voters versus
others regarding the humane treatment of caged farm animals, such as egglaying hens.3 00 Yet, because short reporting periods prevent recordings of
293. But see Bollard, supra note 17, at 10971 (arguing that ag-gag laws cannot be direct
restrictions on speech because there is no constitutional right to record on private
property).
294. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 198.070 (2014) (providing an example of reporting
requirements with respect to other populations).
295. See MO. REV. STAT. § 198.070(3) (2014). There is no discussion of relinquishing
recordings of elder abuse, and the "reasonable time" for reporting seems likely to extend
beyond the twenty-four hours mandated for farm workers. Moreover, because there is
no relinquishment requirement for evidence of elder abuse, employers are less likely to
be able to identify and retaliate against those who report abuse. This means a nursing
home aid, for instance, could create a video documenting a pattern of elder abuse so long
as he reported each instance of suspected abuse to authorities within "a reasonable time."
296. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013(1) (2013) (only recordings made by "farm animal
professionals" of suspected abuse of "farm animals" need be relinquished). If the intent
of the quick reporting period was to allow law enforcement to stamp-out abuse
immediately, the state's concern should equally apply to animals kept as pets, which are
traditionally afforded greater welfare protections than livestock. See, e.g., Mark Bittman,
Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011, 8:30 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/some-animals-are-more-equal-thanothers/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r-0.
297. The videographer must turn over a recording he or she "believes" depicts farm

animal abuse or neglect. Mo.

REV. STAT.

§ 578.013(1) (2013).

298. See Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).
299. See generally id
300. See supra notes 181-188 and accompanying text.
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continual violations, Category Four laws effectively impose a "belief' on the
whistleblower that a single incident of perceived harsh treatment constitutes
abuse or neglect. A farmworker who believes that animal neglect or abuse
is only clear from a pattern or practice of behavior over a period of time must
choose amongst declaring that he believes something that he actually does
not, violating the law, or turning a blind eye. Viewed in this light, Category
Four laws are content-based restrictions that will pass constitutional muster
only if they can survive strict scrutiny.
3. Restriction on Association
-

Similar to a Category Three - No Lying law,30 ' Category Four
Mandatory Disclosure may infringe on freedom of association. 30 2
Legislative history suggests that proponents of ag-gag bills believe people
who make such recordings are affiliated with animal rights groups, and many
people who make such recordings are so affiliated.303 Accordingly, a
Mandatory Disclosure law effectively requires videographers to "out"
themselves as a member of such a group. The content of the recording is
likely to point to its source because few people will have access to -a
particular section of a particular animal facility on any given day. Moreover,
the Missouri law, like other proposed Category Four laws, does not have a
provision for anonymous video relinquishments. 3" In fact, it seems unlikely
that anonymous drops would be allowed because another provision of the act
makes it illegal to edit the recording in any way prior to relinquishment.3 5
The state would have no way to enforce that provision if it allowed
anonymous drops.
In 1958 the Supreme Court declared:
It is hardly a novel perception that
compelled disclosure of affiliation with
groups engaged in advocacy may constitute
[an] effective . . . restraint on freedom of
association. .... This Court has recognized

the vital relationship between freedom to

301. See Bollard, supra note 17, at 10974.
302. The freedom to associate is a Due Process right closely aligned with the freedom
of speech. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960).
303. See Bollard, supra note 17, at 10972 (noting that the sponsors of the Iowa and
Utah bills collectively asserted that their bills were directed at "national propaganda
groups," "activists," "the vegetarian people," and "extremist vegans").
304. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (2013).
305. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013(2).
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associate
and
privacy
in
one's
associations... . Inviolability of privacy in
many
may
in
group
association
be
indispensable
to
circumstances
preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses
dissident beliefs. 3 06
Despite this strong rhetoric, the Court has only invoked the freedom of
association to strike down regulations that directly require disclosure of
affiliations. 307 In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court struck down a state law that
required the NAACP to disclose its membership lists.30 s Soon thereafter, the
Court struck down a state law that required teachers to disclose their
affiliations on a yearly basis.309 In order for these precedents to apply to
Category Four ag-gag laws, the Court would have to extend its holdings to
situations in which the law indirectly results in an affiliation being revealed.
Such an extension would be justified if state legislative histories suggest (1)
an assumption that only those affiliated with animal rights groups make
recordings of livestock abuse, (2) animus toward such groups, and (3) an
intent to use the mandatory disclosure requirement to identify group
affiliates.310
4. Restriction on Newsgathering
If a court declines to find that a Category Four law constitutes
compelled speech or a direct restriction on speech or association, there is a
good chance it will characterize the law as a restriction on newsgathering.

306. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). The authors do not contend that
everyone creating a recording will be affiliated with an animal rights group, let alone
identify as an activist, vegetarian, or "extremist vegan". See Bollard, supra note 17, at
10972. Nonetheless, proponents of the ag-gag laws, at least in Iowa and Utah, believe
that those are the people their bills will target, and their statements to that effect
demonstrate that they are targeting advocacy groups that espouse dissident beliefs. See
Bollard, supra note 17, at 10965-66, 10972. See generally COLIN SPENCER, THE
HERETIC'S FEAST: A HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM (Univ. Press of New England 1995)
(providing a history of vegetarianism and animal rights sentiment, and showing how both
have consistently been viewed as subversive by society at large).
307. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 449.
308. Id
309. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
310. Indiana's failed attempt to create a registry of ag-gag offenders lends credence to
the notion that one objective of the current protectionist agenda is to "take names" of ag
enemies. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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Generally applicable laws that impinge upon newsgathering activities of "the
press"3" are not entitled to heightened First Amendment review the way they
would be if they impinged upon publication.3 12 For example, "generally
applicable laws" include trespass, invasion of privacy, or duty of loyalty.
Nevertheless, even while holding the opposite, the Supreme Court has
indicated in dicta that there should be protections for newsgathering
activities.313 In 1972, Justice White proclaimed: "Nor is it suggested that
news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."3 14 Some scholars have asserted that Justice White's language
has influenced courts to apply heightened review to such laws, despite
precedent like Branzburgto the contrary.3"s The result has been a great deal
of confusion and commentary arguing the need for clarity and reform. 3 16
The best argument against the newsgathering precedents that do not
protect speech, is that Category Four ag-gag laws are not "general laws" like
trespass or invasion of privacy, because of their narrow focus on farms and
farm workers.3 17 That returns the argument to content-based restrictions and
strict scrutiny. The scrutiny that applies to Category Four under the various
foregoing speech analyses is discussed next.

311. There is good reason to believe that newsgathering privileges (to the extent courts
apply any) afforded to "the press" would apply also to "good faith," whistleblowing
employees who had no intent upon accepting employment to record and distribute
footage of illegal activity, but upon seeing such activity decide to record and disseminate
evidence of the wrongdoing. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment does not 'belong' to any
definable category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.").
See also Lambert v. Polk Cnty., Iowa, 723 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Iowa 1989) ("It is not
just news organizations . . . who have First Amendment rights to make and display
videotapes of events-all of us . . . have that right.").
312. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (holding that the First
Amendment did not insulate reporters from criminal sanctions for refusing to testify
before a grand jury even where their testimony might reveal confidential news sources,
reasoning that. . ."the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening
of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general
applicability."). See also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
313. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
314. Id.
315. See Bollard, supra note 17, at 10966-67.
316. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 198, at 1164.
317. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013, supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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5. Application of Strict and Intermediate Scrutiny
If a court found that Category Four laws constituted compelled speech,
content-based speech restrictions, or restrictions on association, the laws
would not withstand strict scrutiny. States would have to demonstrate that
their ag-gag laws were narrowly tailored to protect a compelling government
interest.318 Regardless of what the states may say about a concern for animal
abuse or food safety, if a court considers the legislative history behind these
laws it will be clear that suppressing speech is their underlying intent."' If
the real interest is protecting the reputation of the animal farming industry
by shielding worse evidence of repeated unsafe, abusive behavior, that
interest is related to the suppression of free speech and cannot withstand any
scrutiny.3 2 0 "Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government
seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular
ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion." 32 ' If a court accepts that the real intent of Category
Four laws is speech suppression, then the laws fail any free speech scrutiny
under the first step of the analysis.
Even if a court would countenance that timely reporting of suspected
animal abuse is the compelling interest these laws promote, states cannot
show that the laws are narrowly tailored to that interest. There are numerous
ways that states like Missouri could protect its interest in uncovering farm
animal abuse that have no restrictions on speech. The state could create a
voluntary, anonymous reporting hotline for farm animal abuse. The state
could pass whistleblower protection for farm workers to report abuse without
negative job outcomes. The state could create a self-reporting system for
farms to obtain reduced penalties for animal abuse violations that are selfreported (consistent with the HACCP food safety model, too). All of these

318. Seee.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 800 ("[There is a] First Amendment directive that
government not dictate the content of speech absent compelling necessity, and then, only
by means precisely tailored."); see also Bollard, supra note 17, at 10975-77 (analyzing
ag-gag laws under strict scrutiny).
319. See Landfried, supra note 17, at 390-91 ("[Category Three and Four ag-gag laws]
are deliberately crafted to limit expression"). See also Bollard, supra note 17, at 1096465 (discussing the legislative history of Iowa and Utah's ag-gag laws and the national
agribusiness lobbying groups that have been pushing bills around the country).
320. Bollard, supranote 17, at 10977. This analysis has considered the constitutionality
of the different types of ag-gag laws individually. In practice, states often package two
or more different categories of ag-gag laws together. When a court reviews those laws,
it will likely look to the law as a whole to determine the governmental interest and intent.
321. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). But see Bollard, supra
note 17, at 10971 (arguing that ag-gag laws cannot be direct restrictions on speech
because there is no constitutional right to record on private property).
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options directly accomplish the alleged government interest in uncovering
farm animal abuse. When state legislatures opt for a mandatory disclosure
alternative that only marginally protects farm animals and prevents farm
workers from documenting a habit or pattern of cruelty, it casts doubt on the
alleged government interest and fails strict scrutiny.
A court may effectively apply intermediate scrutiny if it views
Mandatory Disclosure laws as restrictions on newsgathering rather than
direct restrictions on speech or association.3 2 2 A law will pass intermediate
scrutiny "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."3 23
Even if a state has a legitimate economic interest in protecting its
agricultural citizens and employers, it is still unclear that Category Four laws
impose incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms that are no
greater than is essential in the furtherance of that interest. Again, if a state
wants to protect the reputation of its agricultural facilities it could do many
other things that do not hinder speech at all. For instance, it could provide
or enhance state-offered training programs and voluntary audits and
feedback on good husbandry and food safety practices. It also could provide
incentives to companies that provide greater transparency to the public on
their food handling and animal treatment practices. States do not have to
resort to shrouding their agricultural facilities from the public eye. In fact,
the very act of doing so harms their reputation by signaling that they have
something to hide.324 This contradicts the state's interest in protecting its
agriculture economy, rather than serving that interest.
Historically, mandatory reporting has been limited to vulnerable
populations such as the elderly and the disabled.3 25 Further, mandatory
reporting has been imposed only on those with "special relationships" to
those vulnerable populations, such as medical professionals, clergy, or law
enforcement.3 26 Category Four - Mandatory Disclosure laws apparently
consider farm animals akin to those other vulnerable populations and create

322. See Bollard, supra note 17, at 10974-75.
323. United States v. O'Brien, 391. U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
324. See Civita, supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the public view of
ag-gag laws as a method for farms to cover up wrongdoing).
325. See, e.g., Lori Stiegel & Ellen Klein, Reporting Requirements: Provisions and
Citations in Adult Protective Services Laws, By State, A.B.A. COMM'N ON L. & AGING
FOR NAT'L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE (2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/docs/MandatoryReportin
gProvisionsChart.authcheckdam.pdf.
326. Id.
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a special relationship in anyone who works around those animals. That
expansion of an otherwise limited history of mandatory reporting calls into
question the wisdom of Category Four laws and their constitutionality under
the First Amendment.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The most direct way to limit state agricultural protectionism and protect
food safety would be through express federal preemption. Legislative
attempts at federal protectionism like PICA,327 however, and the fact that
Congress has yet to create any whistleblower protection for workers within
USDA's jurisdiction,32 8 suggest that express federal preemption is not on the
horizon. Similarly, the whistleblower protection in FSMA lacks any express
preemptive effect, even though whistleblowers have been the impetus for
federal food safety legislation historically.3 2 9
At best, successful implied preemption defenses in the pending Utah
and Idaho challenges to those ag-gag laws might give express preemptive
legislation some traction.
Possibly more effective would be pressure from state lawmakers
without protectionist laws, to encourage their peers to repeal food libel and
ag-gag laws, and to refrain from introducing any new legislation like that
discussed in Part II. If legislators feel compelled to appease the agricultural,
industrial complex in their states, however, they should consider only an aggag law like Montana's that incorporates a defamation standard.33 0 At least
this approach protects the truth and good faith mistakes, and is also
underpinned by a long history of defamation case law.
Next, legislative peers in the "locavore-friendly" states should urge
protectionist-leaning states to shift to local-friendly efforts and curb their
zeal for protecting industrial farming.331 Although promoting local food is
not mutually exclusive with agricultural protectionism, the local food

&

327. See supra notes 177-89 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Part III.
329. Slaughterhouse whistleblowers have been credited with aiding the passage of both
the 1906 and 1967 Meat Inspection Acts. See Brief for Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 2-3, Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS (D. Utah Jan. 15, 2014).
330. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
331. Ironically, Iowa has been at the forefront of promoting the local farm movement,
while also legislating protectionist farm laws discussed herein. Leah Zerbe, The Best
Worst States for Locally Grown Food, RODALE NEWS (May 15, 2012),
http://www.rodalenews.com/local-food-markets.
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movement is seen as "push back" against industrialized food production. 33 2
As one commentator asserts, "complexity, industrialization, and
globalization of food production," make food less safe.333 Lawmakers in
states with protectionist legislation should reconsider who and what they are
protecting, and at what cost, when they continue to shield industrial food
producers with legislation that suppresses criticism. Protectionist-leaning
legislators need to expand their views about economic value to their states,
rather than just accommodating the wants of big industrial operations that
seek protection under food libel and ag-gag laws. 3 34 Local food production
can benefit entire communities economically through banking, machinery
sales, services, and transportation.33 5
Nevertheless, the next protectionist salvo may directly pit industrial
farming against small urban and suburban farms. In a classic example that
everything old is made new again, the "right to farm" is now reappearing in
the protectionist landscape, and taking on a decidedly small farm versus
industrial agricultural flavor. 3 36 Recently, Michigan's Commission of
Agriculture and Rural Development ruled that its statutory right to farm did
not extend to areas primarily zoned residential. 337 The ruling is perceived to
be a direct attack by industrial agriculture against the local food movement,
because it permits local governments to ban backyard livestock farms.338 The
Michigan Farm Bureau supported the changes, but challenged the
characterization that its membership organization is against small or urban
farms. 339

332. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers
Facing Producersof "Local Foods ", 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 49, 56-58 (2011).
333. Denis W. Steams, A Continuing Plague: Faceless Transactions and the
Coincident Rise of Food Adulteration and Legal Regulation of Quality, 2014 Wis. L.
REV. 421, 423 (2014).
334. For a discussion of whether locally-produced food is safer than industrialized farm
production, see Johnson & Endres, supra note 332, at 91-96.
335. Id. at 97-99.
336. See Richard R. Oswald, Amendment One would not Protect Missouri Family
Farms, Mo. FARMER TODAY (July 2, 2014, 10:30 PM),
http://m.missourifarmertoday.com/news/opinion/amendment-one-would-not-protectmissouri-family-farms/article bl 335ef6-0134-1le4-be2f-0019bb2963f4.html.
337. Michigan's Right to Farm Act FAQ, DEP'T. OF AGRIC. & RURAL DEV.,
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdard/MichigansRighttoFarmActFrequentl
y Asked Questions_-_August_28_2014_455493_7_466935_7.pdf (last updated Aug.
28, 2014).
338. See Rick Pluta, State Agriculture Commission Approves Backyard Livestock Rule,
MICH. RADIO (Apr. 28, 2014, 10:58 PM), http://michiganradio.org/post/state-agriculturecommission-approves-backyard-livestock-rule.
339. Matt Kapp, MFB Statement Regarding Changes to Right to Farm GAAMPs, MICH.
FARM BUREAU (May 5, 2014),
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Escalating this protectionist effort in 2012, North Dakota enacted the
first constitutional right to farm.34 0 The provision reads: "The right of
farmers and ranchers to engage in modem farming and ranching practices
shall be forever guaranteed in this state. No law shall be enacted which
abridges the right of farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural technology,
modem livestock production, and ranching practices." 34 ' Like the recent
Michigan regulatory development, the amendment's protection of "modem"
farming and "agricultural technology" evoked criticism that the state sought
only to protect industrial agriculture.342 The Oklahoma legislature passed a
similar constitutional amendment, but differences in the House and Senate
versions were not reconciled in time to place it on the November ballot.343
Missouri voters narrowly passed a Right to Farm constitutional amendment
in August, 2014.3" Although the enactment makes no reference to "modem"
farm practices,345 the political rhetoric preceding the election claimed the
amendment would protect industrial agriculture, pitting it against smaller
and organic farms.346
One commentator3 47 contends that the movement for constitutional
rights to farm is fundamentally different than the earlier push for statutory
nuisance protections.3 48 Whereas conflicts between farmers and their
neighbors prompted statutory rights to farm, perceived conflicts between instate interests and out-of-state interests provide the impetus for constitutional

https://www.michfb.com/MI/News/PressReleases/Statement_RE_ChangestoRight
to Farm GAAMPs/.
340. See, e.g., Carolyn Orr, First-Of-Its-Kind 'Right to Farm' Law Now Partof North
Dakota Constitution, CSG MIDWEST (Jan. 2013) (emphasis added), available at:
http://www.csgmidwest.org/policyresearch/0113righttofarm.aspx.
See also Wilson,
supra note 141, at 333.
341. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29.
342. Brooke Jarvis, A Constitutional Right to Industrial Farming?, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01BUSINESSWEEK
09/industrial-farming-state-constitutional-amendments-may-give-legal-shield.
343. Ron Hayes, Right to FarmAmendment in Missouri Passes by 2,500 Votes, OKLA.
FARM REPORT (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.oklahomafarmreport.com/wire/news/2014/08/00108_MissouriAmendment
OnePassesO8O62014 054707.php#.U-1 ZEiLITw.
344. Id.
345. See H.R.J. Res. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), available
at http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2014ballot/HJRNos117.pdf.
346. See Missouri Right-to-Farm, Amendment 1 (August 2014), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/MissouriRight-to-Farm,_Amendment_I_%28August_201/4%29
(last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
347. Ross H. Pifer, Right to Farm Statutes and the Changing State of Modern
Agriculture, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707 (2013).
348. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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amendments.3 4 9 Proponents argue that such measures are necessary to
protect a continued food supply. 3 50 Opponents see them as attempts by
agribusiness to combat the legislative agenda of animal welfare groups, 3 5 1
and to exempt itself from legitimate regulation.352 Because these new
constitutional protections are so recent, they have not yielded any conflicts
to analyze at this point. Certainly, designating the right to engage in
"modem" farming as a fundamental right, on par with free speech and
religion, merits future research on the implications of this newest
protectionist effort.
VII. CONCLUSION

In 2012, one commentator opined that, despite almost a decade of
criticism for food disparagement laws, their continued presence on the books
of twelve states could embolden these state legislatures and others to initiate
new forms of protectionism.35 3 The latest generation of ag-gag laws and
constitutional rights to farm, seems to confirm that prediction. These, along
with a ten-figure food libel claim that has survived a motion to dismiss and
will be heard by a jury, put free speech regarding food safety and farm policy
at risk. A proposal to preempt stringent state animal rights laws'or
agriculture constraints reflects an atmosphere that does not bode well for
food safety. Ultimately, court intervention on the constitutional rights at
issue in these matters may be necessary to stem the tide of agricultural
protectionism.

349. Pifer, supra note 347, at 719.
350. See Missouri Farming Rights Amendment, MO. FARMERS CARE,
http://mofarmerscare.com/farming-rights-amendment/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
351. See Pifer, supra note 347, at 716-17. See also Brent Haden, The Right to Farm
Amendment - A Perspective by Attorney Brent Haden, MO. FARMERS CARE (Oct. 23,
2013),
http://mofarmerscare.com/the-right-to-farm-amendment-a-perspective-byattorney-brent-haden/; Oklahoma Right to Farm Amendment Clears First Hurdle,
PROTECT THE HARVEST, http://protecttheharvest.com/oklahoma-right-farm-amendmentclears-first-hurdle/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (quoting Rep. Scott Biggs, author of
Oklahoma's proposed amendment as saying, "Like it or not, agriculture is under attack
from some of these animal rights groups.").
352. See, e.g.,Quentin Hope, States Ponder the "Right to Farm", HIGH PLAINS PUB.
RADIO (June 4, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://hppr.org/post/states-ponder-right-farm.
353. Cain, supra note 12, at 310.

